The following article may evoke different understandings, not everything we  read or see is 100% digestible, but there are parts that certainly stand  out.
 Salisbury writes, "That a Muslim immigrant would not think twice about this  simple civic act speaks volumes about the power of American society and the  actual day-to-day lives and conduct of Muslims in this nation, particularly  immigrant Muslims."
 There have been studies done extensively where someone is murdered or raped  in day light where no one pays attention, in many a incidents no one  wants to get involved. Secondly there is other side of human beings; civic  responsibility. I am pondering over the writers assumption that a Muslim  immigrant would not think twice... civic responsibility is a human  characteristic regardless of the religion one believes in, just as destruction  is the characteristic of the deviants. 
 Nias, lays out a great truth, " "If one person is bad, they are  going to say everybody for this religion." That is wrong and is stereotyping and  that is one of the things that worsens a given situation. It is no worse than  stereotyping Italians, Irish, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, Mexicans, African  Americans, Arabs and others.  
 Mike Ghouse
  _________________________________________________
 Citizen Alioune
How not to deal with Muslims in America
by Stephan Salisbury
 How not to deal with Muslims in America
by Stephan Salisbury
Alioune Niass, the Sengalese Muslim vendor who first spotted the now  infamous smoking SUV in Times Square and alerted police, is no hero.
 If it were not for the Times of London, we would not even know of his  pivotal role in the story. No mainstream American newspaper bothered to mention  or profile Niass, who peddles framed photographs of celebs and the Manhattan  skyline. None of the big television stations interviewed him.
 As far as the readers of the New York Times are concerned – not to mention  the New York Post and the Daily News – Niass doesn't exist. Nor does he exist  for President Obama, who telephoned Lance Orton and Duane Jackson, two fellow  vendors, to thank them for their alertness in reporting the SUV. The New York  Mets even fetedJackson and Orton as heroes at a game with the San Francisco  Giants.
 And Niass? Well, no presidential phone calls, no encomiums, no articles  (though his name did finally surface briefly at a New York Times blog several  days after the incident), no free Mets tickets. Yet as the London Times  reported, it was Niass who first saw the clouds of smoke seeping from the SUV on  that Saturday night.
 He hadn't seen the car drive up, because he was attending to customers –  and, for a vendor in Times Square, Saturday nights are not to be taken lightly.  Niass was alarmed, however, when he saw that smoke. "I thought I should call  911," he told theTimes, "but my English is not very good and I had no credit  left on my phone, so I walked over to Lance, who has the T-shirt stall next to  mine, and told him. He said we shouldn't call 911. Immediately he alerted a  police officer nearby." Then the cop called 911.
 So Lance got the press, and he and Jackson, who also reported the SUV, have  been celebrated as "heroes." As the Times interview with Niass has made the  Internet rounds, there have been calls for the recognition of his "heroism,"  too.
 These three men all acted admirably. The two other vendors did what any  citizen ought to do on spotting a smoldering car illegally parked on a busy  street. But heroes? In the case of Niass, characterizing him as a hero may in a  sense diminish the significance of his act.
 A vendor in New York since 9/11, he saw something amiss and reported it,  leading him into contact with the police. That a Muslim immigrant would not  think twice about this simple civic act speaks volumes about the power of  American society and the actual day-to-day lives and conduct of Muslims in this  nation, particularly immigrant Muslims.
 This was a reasonably routine act for Orton and Jackson, but for Niass it  required special courage, and the fact that he acted anyway only underscores  what should be an obvious fact about Muslims in post-9/11 America: they  represent a socially responsible and engaged community like any other.
 Assault on American Muslims
 Why do I say that his act required courage?
 Like many Muslim immigrants in New York City and around the country, Niass  senses that he is viewed with suspicion by fellow citizens – and particularly by  law enforcement authorities – simply because of his religion. In an interview  withDemocracy Now!, that essential independent radio and television news  program, Niass said that, in terrorism cases, law enforcement authorities view  every Muslim as a potential threat. Ordinary citizens become objects of  suspicion for their very ordinariness. "If one person is bad, they are going to  say everybody for this religion. That is, I think, wrong."
 As far as Niass is concerned, terrorists are, at best, apostates,  irreligious deviants. "That not religion," he told his interviewer, "because  Islam religion is not terrorist. Because if I know this guy is Muslim, if I know  that, I'm going to catch him before he run away."
 The New York Police Department Intelligence Division, the FBI, and  Immigration and Customs Enforcement all routinely run armies of informers  through the city's Middle Eastern and South Asian communities. In the immediate  wake of 9/11, sections of New York experienced sweeps by local and federal  agents. The same in Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Houston, and communities on  the West Coast – everywhere, in fact, that Muslims cluster together.
 I've been reporting on this for years (and have made it the subject of my  bookMohamed's Ghosts: An American Story of Love and Fear in the Homeland).  Despite the demurrals of law enforcement officials, these sweeps and ongoing,  ever widening investigations have focused exclusively on Muslim enclaves. I have  seen the destructive impact on family and community such covert police activity  can have: broken homes, deported parents, bereft children, suicides, killings,  neighbors filled with mutual suspicions, daily shunning as a fact of life.  "Since when is being Muslim a crime?" one woman whose husband had been swept up  off a street in Philadelphia asked me.
 Muslim residents have been detained, jailed, and deported by the thousands  since 9/11. We all know this, and law enforcement and federal officials have  repeatedly argued that these measures are necessary in the new era ushered in by  al-Qaeda. A prosecutor once candidly told me that it made no sense to spend time  investigating or watching non-Muslims. Go to the source, he said.
 Radicalization Is a Problem of Limited Proportions
 There are many problems with this facile view, and two recent studies – one  from a think-tank funded in large part by the federal government, the other from  the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University and the University of  North Carolina's departments of religion and sociology (using a U.S. Department  of Justice grant) – highlight some of the most glaring contradictions.
 The Rand Corporation studied the incidence of terrorist acts since Sept.  11, 2001, and found that the problem, while serious, was wildly overblown. There  have been, Rand researchers determined, all of 46 incidents of Americans or  long-time U.S. residents being radicalized and attempting to commit acts of  terror (most failing woefully) since 9/11. Those incidents involved a total of  125 people. Think about that number for a moment: it averages out to about six  cases of purported radicalization and terrorism a year. Faisal Shahzad's utterly  inept effort in Times Square would make incident 47. In the 1970s, the report  points out, the country endured, on average, around 70 terrorist incidents a  year. From January 1969 to April 1970 alone, the U.S. somehow managed to survive  4,330 bombings, 43 deaths, and $22 million of property damage.
 The Rand report, "Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist  Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001," argues that  ham-handed surveillance and aggressive police investigations can be, and often  are, counter-productive, sowing a deep-seated fear of law enforcement and  immigration authorities throughout Muslim communities – whose assistance is  vital in coping with the threat of Islamic terrorism, tiny as it is here.
 Family members, friends, and neighbors are far more likely to know when  someone is headed down a dangerously radical path than the police, no matter how  many informers may be in a neighborhood. "On occasion, relatives and friends  have intervened," the Rand researchers write. "But will they trust the  authorities enough to notify them when persuasion does not work?" And will the  authorities actually use the information provided by family members when they  receive it? Don't forget the perfunctory manner in which CIA officials treated  the father of the underwear bomber when he tried to report his son as an  imminent threat.
 The second study, conducted by a research team from Duke University and the  University of North Carolina, found similarly small numbers of domestic terror  plots and incidents since 9/11. The report identifies 139 Muslim Americans who  have been prosecuted for planning or executing acts of terrorist violence since  Sept. 11, 2001, an average of 17 a year. (Again, most of these attempted acts of  terror, as in the Shahzad case, were ineptly planned, if planned at all.) Like  the Rand report, the Duke-UNC study highlights the meager numbers: "This level  of 17 individuals a year is small compared to other violent crime in America but  not insignificant. Homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem."
 The Duke-UNC researchers conducted 120 in-depth interviews with Muslims in  four American cities to gain insight into the problem of homegrown Islamic  terrorism and the response of Muslim Americans to it. Why so few cases? Why so  little radicalization? Not surprisingly, what the researchers found was  widespread hostility to extremist ideologies and strong Muslim community efforts  to quash them – efforts partially driven by a desire for self-protection, but  more significantly by moral, ethical, and theological hostility to violent  fundamentalist ideologies.
 Both of these reports underscore the importance of what the researchers  call "self-policing" within Muslim communities. They consider it a critical and  underutilized factor in combating terrorism in the U.S. Far from being secretive  breeding grounds for radicalism, the Duke-UNC report argues, mosques and other  Muslim community institutions build ties to the nation and larger world while  working to root out extremist political fundamentalism. It was not for nothing  that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed instructed his 9/11 hijackers to steer clear of  Muslim Americans, their mosques, and their institutions.
 The UNC-Duke report urges federal and local officials to work aggressively  to integrate Muslim communities even more fully into the American political  process. Authorities, it suggests, should be considering ways of supporting and  strengthening those communities by actively promoting repeated Muslim  denunciations of violence. (Such condemnations have been continuous since 9/11  but are rarely reported in the press.) Public officials should also work to  ensure that social service agencies are active in Muslim neighborhoods, should  aggressively pursue claimed infractions of civil rights laws, and should focus  on establishing working relationships with Muslim groups when it comes to  terrorism and law enforcement issues.
 The Times Square incident – and, yes, the small but vital role played by  Alioune Niass – illustrate the importance of these commonsensical  recommendations. Yet the media has ignored Niass, and law-enforcement agencies  have once again mounted a highly public, fear-inducing investigation justified  in the media largely by anonymous leaks. This recreates the creepy feeling of  what happened in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: the appearance of a massive,  chaotic, paranoid probe backed by media speculation disguised as reporting. A  warehouse raided in South Jersey. Why? No answers. A man led away in handcuffs  from a Boston-area home. Who is he? What is his role? Was he a money man? Maybe.  But maybe not. Suspicious packages. Oddly parked trucks. Tips. Streets closed.  Bomb squads cautiously approaching ordinary boxes or vehicles. No answers – even  after the all-clear rings out and the yellow caution tape comes down.
 More importantly, the controlled flow of anonymous leaks to the mainstream  press has laid the groundwork for the Obama administration to threaten Pakistan  harshly – even as Iraq and Afghanistan sink further into deadly and destructive  fighting – and to ponder extreme revisions of criminal procedures involving the  rights of suspects. The administration's radical suggestion to suspend Miranda  rights and delay court hearings for terrorism suspects amounts to a threat to  every American citizen's right to an attorney and a defense against state power.  Is this the message the country wants to send "the evil doers," as President  Bush used to call them?
 Or have we already taken the message of those evil doers to heart? Faisal  Shahzad, an American citizen taken into custody on American soil, disappeared  into the black hole of interrogation for more than two weeks – despite President  Obama's assertion to a CIA audience over a year ago that "what makes the United  States special … is precisely the fact that we are willing to uphold our values  and our ideals even when it's hard, not just when it's easy, even when we are  afraid and under threat, not just when it's expedient to do so."
 When the going gets tough, as Attorney General Holder made clear on Meet  the Presson May 9, the tough change the rules. "We're now dealing with  international terrorists," he said, "and I think that we have to think about  perhaps modifying the rules that interrogators have and somehow coming up with  something that is flexible and is more consistent with the threat that we now  face." None of this is good news for Muslims in America – or for the rest of  us.
 Stephan Salisbury is cultural writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer. His  most recent book is Mohamed's Ghosts: An American Story of Love and Fear in the  Homeland.The latest TomCast audio interview in which he discusses the words that  changed our world since Sept. 11, 2001, can be heard by clicking here or  downloaded to your iPod by clicking here.
 [Note to Readers: If you are interested in reading the Duke  University-University of North Carolina study, it is available by clicking here,  as is the Rand report by clicking here. (Note that both are .pdf files.) Khalid  Sheikh Mohammed's aversion to contact with U.S. Muslims is mentioned in evidence  presented at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui and can be found in .pdf format on  page 36 of defense exhibit 941 here. For another view of just how overblown the  Islamic terrorist threat in the U.S. is, check out Tom Engelhardt's "Fear,  Inc."]
 Copyright 2010 Stephan Salisbury
 
 
 
 
 

 

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