.
Thanks Yoginder for the comprehensive write up on the governance side of Islam.
El-effendi has touched just about every critical element of the Muslim society. There is another critical element that needs to permeate in human psyche; that my faith is dear to me and works for me, but to claim “my way is the only way” is sheer arrogance. It is the arrogance that breeds conflicts and leads to wars and oppression, the very thing the wisdom of Islam opposes. Indeed, the least person God likes is the one who is arrogant, the idea behind the wisdom of Islam and every religion is to promote peaceful co-existence where we learn to accept and respect the God given uniqueness of each one of us. As beauty is in they eyes of the beholder, faith is in the heart of the believer.
We have to re-assess if there was indeed an Islamic government at all? Prophet Muhammad did not assign a priest or a clergy to carry the religion forward; indeed, there is no clergy in Islam. The religion was complete and the responsibility to follow the moral conduct of co-existence was assigned to each individual, as the individuals are accountable for their own actions and not any one else. Weren't the first caliphs selected out of consensus to govern the public affairs and not religion?
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2009/07/who-needs-islamic-state.html
Mike Ghouse
To be a Muslim is to be a peacemaker, one who seeks to mitigate conflicts and nurtures goodwill for peaceful co-existence. God wants us to live in peace and harmony with his creation; that is indeed the purpose of religion, any religion. Mission statement
Who Needs An Islamic State?
By Yoginder Sikand
Abdelwahab El-Affendi is a well-known Islamic scholar and political philosopher from Sudan , presently based in London . Author of numerous works, his latest book, provocatively titled ‘Who Needs an Islamic State?’ discusses what he regards as the serious lacunae in contemporary Islamist political thought, which, in his view, have caused Islamist movements to reach a virtual dead-end, creating many more problems (for Muslims as well as others) than they have been able to solve. El-Affendi seeks to argue the case for a paradigm shift in Muslim political thinking in order to fashion a contextually relevant understanding of Islam and its role in, and relation to, the public sphere.
Islamism may be described as a version of Islam predicated on the centrality of the notion of an ‘Islamic state’ whose principal function is to enforce, and rule by, what is conventionally regarded as shariah law. Islamism is far from being the homogenous phenomenon that it is often taken to be. Nor are all versions of Islamism necessarily incompatible with democracy. Undeniably, however, many forms of Islamism are. Islamist ideologues, driven by triumphalist, even apocalyptic, fervor, have failed to a develop consistent position on such crucial issues as limits to state authority, people’s participation in law-making and governance, the role and status of non-Muslims and women and the question of violence. Almost all recent experiments in setting up ‘Islamic states’ have involved tremendous bloodshed, conflict and large-scale suppression of democratic rights, including of Muslims themselves. The tantalizing utopian society that Islamists promise to usher in seems to recede even further into the realm of possibility once Islamists come to power.
This, in brief is what El-Affendi argues in his book. He contends that, once in power, Islamist parties inevitably turn sternly authoritarian. This is inevitable, he suggests, because the leaders of these parties firmly believe that their understanding of Islam corresponds most closely to the Divine Will and hence cannot be opposed and must be imposed, even against the opposition of a significant section of the population, Muslims as well as others. Islamists in power generally have a very poor record of respecting democracy, though the author rightly notes, it is unfair to blame them alone for the serious democratic deficit in much of the Muslim world since they are more often than not the victims of despotism, both of Western imperialist powers and of regimes in Muslim counties closely allied to the West. Yet, he insists, even victims have choices. When out of power, the ‘misguided anti-democratic rhetoric’ of Islamists provides many a despot with ‘an alibi and a pretext to oppose democratisation’, and in the few instances when Islamists have managed to acquire power, their record in upholding democratic rights has generally been dismal.
El-Affendi critiques the Islamists obsession with the struggle for acquiring power as a means to enforce shariah. Instead, he advises that it is not primarily political but, rather, moral influence that Islam requires its followers to seek to acquire. The best way to communicate Islam to others, which is the principal duty of Muslims, is not through the force of arms, but, rather, for Muslims to exemplify Islamic virtues in their own lives and to offer an alternative model of life to the rampant consumerism and centralization of power characteristic of Western-inspired models of ‘modernity’. Sadly, he says, this is not happening. In fact, or so he claims, Muslims are even more materialistic than others, while contributing little or nothing to the world in terms of science and technology. As he very aptly, though bluntly, puts it, ‘We sound a lot sillier today when we claim that the Muslims should be a light unto mankind and show exemplary conduct and moral leadership. Now, it would be more realistic to just say we wish that Muslims should stop blowing themselves up and getting innocent people killed in the process.’
El-Affendi recognizes continued injustices directed by others against Muslims, as in Palestine , Afghanistan and Iraq , and also admits that violence in the name of Islam is often a response or reaction to the oppression of Western powers and of their client regimes in the Muslim world. Yet, he suggests, reacting to this with indiscriminate counter-violence, as some Islamist groups have, is not in line with Quranic teachings. Further, he adds, ‘The quest for the moral high ground is for Muslims not just a requirement of a higher moral order but an imperative of survival.’
El-Affendi believes that values underlying democracy, such as justice, fairness, decency, rational conduct, can be said to be ‘total harmony’ with a certain broad and inclusive understanding of Islam. The anti-democratic thrust of much contemporary Islamic political thought is thus not a necessary outcome of Islam itself. Rather, the he argues, it owes much to the fact that Islamism emerged as a response to Western colonialism and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate at the hands of Western powers. That historical context in which it emerged favored an authoritarian vision of state. Yet, El-Affendi says, that model of the state is outdated and does not do justice to the demands of Islam, for it miserably fails to guarantee justice and basic freedoms that, in his view, Islam insists upon. At the same time, he is not unmindful of the present imbalance of power at the global level that is heavily tilted against Muslim countries. One way to address the problem, he suggests, is for at least one leading Muslim state to be set up or promoted that would be accepted by other Muslim countries as a sort of leader, in the same manner in which the USA is accepted as the leader of the West. This would be less ambitious than the classical Muslim Caliphate, and would fall short of leading to a European Union sort of arrangement, though it could eventually lead to it. Such a state, which should be a viable democracy with a strong economic base and vibrant cultural life, could, he believes, play a major role in addressing the endemic instability of the Muslim world. He holds this out as a realistic alternative to the utopian vision of the Caliphate in Islamist circles.
A major concern of El-Affendi is to critique certain key aspects of traditional and contemporary Muslim political thought and discourse. He laments that many Muslims are reluctant to review the Muslim political heritage, somehow treating it as sacred, and even ardently defending those aspects of it that are patently immoral and, therefore, un-Islamic. For Muslims to critically reassess this heritage, he points out, does not mean abandoning the absolute commitment to the ideals that shaped it. A major aspect of Muslim political thought that he subjects to incisive critique is what he regards as its extreme idealism and the related tension between the ideal and the reality of Muslim political life. Islamists, he argues, are impelled by an extremely idealistic, indeed utopian, vision of the world, one that has scant concern for realism. Hence their willingness to resort to violence and authoritarianism to serve what they believe are divine ends. Hence, too, their ultimate failures. Commitment to Islamic ideals must go, El-Affendi advises, with what he calls a ‘healthy realism’.
While defending democracy and the rights of minorities, El-Affendi does not advocate that Muslim countries uncritically adopt Western-style secular, democratic state structures. In fact, he is bitterly critical of the modern state, which, instead of serving society, demands that society serve it. He draws inspiration from the polity set up by the Prophet Muhammad, which was, he says, characterized by voluntary participation, and was based on morality rather than coercion.
The ideal polity established by the Prophet was, however, subverted shortly after the Prophet’s demise, when the proto-democratic Caliphate was transformed into authoritarian monarchy that heralded the collapse of the idealist project. This, El-Affendi notes, resulted in the decline of the role of the wider community in political affairs and the further narrowing of Muslim political theory. It was at this time that doctrines were invented, including by some court-related ulema, making obedience to rulers compulsory even if they were tyrants. This justification that was sought to be bestowed on tyranny remains a greatly problematic aspect of Muslim political thought.
Another major drawback of traditional Muslim and modern Islamist political theory is, El-Affendi tells us, that since it is based on the notion of the Caliph as a virtually saintly leader, there are no proper checks and balances to his powers. The insistence on perfection in the Caliph, he perceptively notes, ‘has automatically removed from the community the right to criticize him, for everyone is by definition less pious, less learned and less wise than he is.’ The solution to the problems of the Muslim ummah was believed to depend on the arrival of an individual saintly ruler, which is precisely what leaders of various Islamist groups and Muslim messianic movements projected themselves as. The waiting for this ‘impossible arrival’ was, El-Affendi comments, ‘bound to relegate Muslim thinking to the realm of mythology and passive ineptitude.’ He suggests that Muslim political theory be revised by detailing the ideals inherent in Islamic history and norms in a more realistic fashion, and by insisting that they be adhered to in practice.
El-Affendi is bitterly critical of the tendency in Islamist circles to project the Caliphate as an end in itself, rather than as a means to certain desirable ends, such as justice and democracy. He finds fault with key Islamist ideologues, such as Maududi and Syed Qutb, for their aversion to democracy and their advocacy of a totalitarian, fascist-like state in the name of the Caliphate, whose ruler would be advised by a shura council but who could override its opinion. This would allow him to be a virtual dictator. In such a set-up, El-Affendi argues, totalitarianism would be further reinforced because the Caliph and the state he presides over would be charged with the responsibility of promoting virtue and combating vice, which could easily result in malpractices as well as gross interference in people’s private affairs. This, in turn, would surely lead to people opposing the Islamic state, as the experience of numerous countries where such experiments have been sought to be imposed so tragically illustrates.
In this regard, El-Affendi argues for effective checks on the powers of the Caliph or amir or leader of the Muslim state, because, he says, the conventional notion that the Caliph cannot be a tyrant because only the most pious persona can be selected for the post is wholly unrealistic. He notes that some scholars suggest that the amir be bound by the consensus (ijma) of the ulema, but he prefers to concur with the suggestion of Hasan al-Turabi, head of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, who argues that the amir should follow the ijma of the people, whose choice should be enlightened by religious as well as secular experts. El-Affendi also approvingly refers to the noted Tunisian Islamist Rashid al-Ghanoushi, who stresses that Islamist movements should consider themselves as just one among many actors within a liberal-democratic state and that they should regards themselves neither as the guardians of Islamic morality, nor as the sole authority as regards the interpretation of Islam. In other words, an Islamist party must shed its monopolistic tendencies and see itself as just another political party offering its programme to people, inviting them to decide freely between it and its rivals. In such a scheme of things, Islamic parties must acknowledge that there is always a possibility that they could lose to non-Islamic parties in freely-held elections, and they should respect the verdict of the electorate.
Another key aspect of Islamist political thought that El-Affendi scrutinizes is its vision of the state that is based on the notion of what he aptly terms ‘a principle of restriction’, which he contrasts with the original Islamic vision of the polity as based on ‘a principle of liberation and self-fulfillment’. This model is based on the notion of a benevolent autocrat who rules mainly though punitive powers. Not surprisingly, this model has throughout Muslim history been used by despots to shore up their own legitimacy and powers. Another crucial flaw of this model is what he terms as the ‘totalitarian quasi-utopian vision in which the Islamists conceive of a mighty state dragging an unwilling community along the path of virtue and obedience to the law’. This is reflected in their concern mainly with legal prohibitions and restrictions in the law. The citizen that Islamists seek to mould is essentially someone who is deprived of the freedom to sin, but, ironically, also one who lacks the freedom to be virtuous either. El-Affendi argues that this was certainly not God’s purpose when He created human beings endowed with free will.
The issue of community identity in an Islamic state also remains a subject of intense debate, El-Affendi points out. While many Islamists insist on following the medieval fiqh tradition in treating non-Muslims as dhimmis, with several restrictions on their rights, he refers to some Islamist ideologues who are now willing to revise the notion of dhimmi and consider non-Muslims as co-founders of the state and as full citizens with equal rights as Muslims. This reflects a growing realization that the division of the world in the classical fiqh tradition between dar ul-harb (‘Abode of War’) and dar ul-islam (‘Abode of Islam’) is a post-Quranic development that has no sanction in the Quran. El-Affendi eagerly supports the notion of dar ul-ahd (‘Abode of Treaty’) that some Muslim scholars have proposed, connoting states where communities agree to peacefully coexist. In such states, democracies where Muslims have equal rights, including the right to follow and propagate their faith, there can be no room for armed jihad, and Muslims must seek to cultivate peaceful and harmonious relations with non-Muslim fellow citizens.
This, however, does not mean, El-Affendi clarifies, that Islam is reconciled to the present Western-inspired international order, for, he says, it must play its role of being the sole remaining major challenger to the liberal-democratic Western-dominated international system in order to establish justice, first within Muslim communities and countries, and then, internationally.
Similarly, with reference to the notion of ummah, which some radical Islamists argue must translate into political unity of all Muslims across the world, El-Affendi chooses to side with those Muslim thinkers who consider that the notion does not preclude allegiance to a particular state. True, he argues, a Muslim’s ultimate loyalty must be to God, not to a community or state. Yet, other loyalties, such as to the family, tribe, nation and country, need not be seen as necessarily contradictory to this ultimate loyalty. This is why, he says, Islam recognized these other facets of identity, but sublimated and gave them a new expression within the new context of belief. In some ways, he adds, modernity and the modern system of nation- states can actually help advance some Islamic ideals. In theory, modernity allows for democracy, freedom (albeit one controlled by social responsibility and spiritual welfare), justice and peaceful interaction between different peoples, thus promoting the creation of a truly global community, which, El-Affendi says, is in accordance with Islamic teachings. In this regard, Islam, properly understood, can play an important role as a source of moral guidance to create a peaceful and just world order and to end the present heavily-skewed global imbalances of power and resources. El-Affendi sees this as part of the mandate of a community that regards itself as a ‘witness over mankind’, which should manifest itself in transcending self-interest in favour of global responsibility, attacking consumerism, nurturing the environment and offering an alternative to the international order based on the notion of the egotistic nation-state as a collection of individuals and groups motivated largely by narrowly-defined self-interest. These notions should, he argues, be recast in a moral context by redefining the role of the Muslim ummah as the conscience of mankind.
One of El-Affendi’s serious concerns with traditional as well as contemporary Muslim political thought is that it does not adequately provide for formal decision-making mechanisms suitable for a complex, modern state. One reason for this is that both are based on the model of the small-scale and closely-knit polity established by the Prophet in Medina , which, in turn, was built on a society characterized by mutual trust, close personal interaction and easy, mainly face-to-face communications. The charismatic nature of the leadership provided by the Prophet made it unnecessary to have formal decision-making structures that would require all leading figures to take part in the political process. Today, however, El-Affendi notes, the situation is vastly different, and more institutionalized and formal arrangements for decision-making and power-sharing are required in order to administer large nation-states. This is something that Muslim political thought has not devoted sufficient attention to. In this context, El-Affendi argues that that the idea of a single Caliph, so central to traditional Sunni political thought, may have to be replaced in favour of rule by a council of people, a system more in tune with the concept and realities of the modern state.
El-Affendi is also critical of the Islamists’ tendency to hanker after a single saintly hero, in the model of an ideal Caliph or a Mujaddid or a Mahdi, who could, almost miraculously, solve all the problems of the Muslims in particular, and the world in general. He rightly regards this as misplaced utopianism, pointing out the impossibility of applying political techniques suitable for small city states to vast countries. The classical Sunni caliphate model that both traditional ulema and Islamists seek to recreate, he insists, belongs to the category of republican city-states of the past and is unworkable in today, in a world of vast, multi-ethnic, modern states.
An aspect of the political practice of many contemporary Islamist groups that engages El-Affendi’s concern is what he regards as their overwhelming focus on the fight against foreign enemies, whether real or imaginary, which has been at the cost of the struggle for internal reforms within the Muslim community. This indicates a lack of sufficient introspection and self-critique and an unfortunate tendency to blame others wholly for one’s own weaknesses, failures and travails. Because of this, he argues, all sorts of corruption, despotism, mismanagement and ineptitude have been tolerated among Muslims ‘in the name of the fight against this enemy or that’, while ‘the enemy within, the biggest of all, was left untouched’.
A key aspect of the practice of modern Islamist movements that El-Affendi finds greatly problematic is their near obsession with ruling through restriction, control and punishment, rather than through working for the positive enablement of their citizens. This has made for proto-fascist tendencies to emerge within their ranks, ultimately causing the very people whom they supposedly wanted to reform in the name of Islam to oppose and even, as in some places, revolt against them. This, so El-Affendi says, was not the original Islamic idea of a political community, and can only be counterproductive to the cause of building up a truly moral Islamic society and polity.
By seeking to ‘establish’ Islam through coercion, and thus making capture of the state and its coercive powers their first or major concern, Islamist forces might thus only be causing their own downfall, El-Affendi argues. Their harsh, authoritarian approach to enforcing Islamic morality can only lead to corruption and widespread hypocrisy, causing alienation from, rather than genuine commitment to, Islam.
This means, El-Affendi writes, that the search for an ideal state must begin with the search for freedom for Muslims, including the freedom to think, to act, to even sin and to repent, to find oneself and one’s fulfillment in obeying God—only then can a truly righteous Muslim community and state emerge. This requires that, for the present, Muslims must participate wholeheartedly in the struggle for democracy, for right of every individual not to be coerced into doing anything his or her will. Only in this freedom will society be able to evolve an ethics based on the Prophetic model, wherein people submit to Islam voluntarily and abide by its rules by their conscience, not through fear of the state and its agencies of punishment. At the same time, El-Affendi adds, the freedom that he advocates is not one without moral restraints. To be free is not to be amoral. Rather, it means to be free from external, undesirable constraints. Yet, to be genuinely free also requires that the state must not be totalitarian, contrary to how several modern Islamist ideologues have conceived of it. The ideal Muslim state, as well as the Muslim community in general, does have the duty to help each individual achieve his or her moral potential, but it cannot shoulder the individual’s ultimate duty with regard to his or her own actions. El-Affendi recognizes that for any political community to function there has to be an element of coercion involved, but, he says, the ideal polity cannot approve of any element of coercion other than the minimum inherent in the principle of community itself. The Muslim state or the Muslim community cannot compel people to be righteous against their will, for that would only lead to hypocrisy, which Islam abhors. This is also a sure recipe for despotism, as the state, imagining itself to be the instrument of the Divine Will, can easily assume its moral duty to be to compel people to act against their own conscience. In other words, then, the state must be a democratic one, based on the free will of its citizens and the principle of peaceful resolution of differences and free debate about the demands of Islam and the operation of the community. It should also respect cultural and religious pluralism, and accommodate non-Muslims as equal citizens with equal rights and freedom. El-Affendi argues the case for a polity in a plural society as being an association of independent religious communities coexisting with each other, governed by a treaty rather than by a rigid Constitution in order to give the communities greater autonomy. Such a treaty would detail the rights and duties of all communities and would safeguard their common existence, similar to covenant of Medina covenant that brought the Muslims, under the Prophet, with the non-Muslim communities of Medina , in a common polity.
This would be a different sort of polity to the conventional modern state. Communities would join together not as subjects of an all powerful state, but as members of communities united voluntarily, each pursuing its own way of life in full freedom. This polity would allow for only that much coercion as is needed to safeguard and maintain the polity itself, but coercion would not the basis of the polity. In such a polity, a person would be free to join the community and polity of his or her choice or leave freely, something that is absent in the current international order, where citizens must conform to state-dictated norms and where freedom of movement to join other polities is severely restricted. In place of the territory-based modern state, El-Affendi suggests a polity which is not strictly territorial, and an international order based on peacefully co-existing communities rather than territorially-based and mutually exclusive nation states. It would not be an intrusive, coercive organisation that seeks to impose specific norms. Instead, it would be a co-operative association to help people to live freely according to the dictates of their conscience. It would conform to the shariah, but the shariah would not be imposed. Rather, the conformity to the shariah would be to the extent of the free expression of the free will of its Muslim citizens.
Such a state is to be distinguished from conventional states in that it has a higher moral purpose. It should, El-Affendi says, serve as a light for all humankind, and not being engrossed, as all other states are, in an endless search for comforts and material goods for its people. It must be characterized by a philosophy of giving and sharing, unlike conventional states, whose component groups vie with each other for the maximum possible self-aggrandisement.
This brings El-Affendi to the greatly controversial issue of the imposition of the shariah. He persuasively argues that attempts to force Muslims to abide by the shariah have inevitably failed in the past, and have even proven counter-productive. In this regard, then, conventional Islamist political thought is gravely lacking. The shariah, El-Affendi says, can rule only through the willing consensus of Muslims, when the community observing it perceives it as a liberating act, as the true fulfillment of the self. In other words, since the shariah must entail willing compliance to its rules, in actual fact it can never be imposed, whether by the state, an Islamist party or by Muslim clerics. When it is imposed against the will of the people, it is no longer shariah. When only coercion, not consent, underpins the rule of the shariah, it becomes hypocrisy.
The issue of the enforcement of the shariah by the state also shapes the way in which Islamists conceive the state itself—as almost an end in itself, or, at least, as the principle means to enforce the shariah. El-Affendi points out that this displaces the role of individuals in establishing justice, making social activity, including the dispensation of justice, dependent on the will of rulers, who can thereby easily turn into despots. Islamists often take the state as end in itself. And, since the Islamist party or the ‘Islamic’ state comes to be seen as an end in itself, in many cases self-styled Islamic movements have exhibited an unfortunate tendency of allowing their ends to govern their means, not stopping from engaging in blatantly un-Islamic and criminal acts, such as killing innocent people and engaging in terrorism, in order to achieve what they regard as noble ends. El-Affendi insists that Islam does not allow for this sort of approach at all.
El-Affendi is particularly critical of modern Islamist ideologues, such as the Egyptian Syed Qutb and the Pakistani Abul Ala Maududi, who conceived of an ideal Islamic state as being totalitarian, anti-democratic, authoritarian and coercive. He is bitter about what he calls the Islamists’ ‘self-righteous pretensions’, which translates into ‘a readiness to resort to violence at the slightest pretext’. He likens them to the Khawarij or Kharijites, an early splinter group from among the Muslims, who saw themselves alone as true Muslims, and the rest of the world, including other Muslims, as deviant, aberrant, even anti-Islamic, thus ruling out any room for compromise.
While still upholding the notion of a Muslim state moulded or guided by religio-moral concerns and principles, el-Affendi points to the serious gaps in modern Islamist political thought, indicating the way forward for the emergence of a genuinely democratic, pluralist and contextually-relevant Muslim political discourse.
Showing posts with label Islamic State. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic State. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Sunday, June 8, 2008
Islamic state, or state of Islam
Islamic state, or state of Islam by Aisha Sherazi
In the book review below, Aisha Sherazi has rightly pointed out the issues we have not dealt with, Insha Allah; I will make an attempt to responds to a few issues;
She writes “Which brings me to my initial point. If interpretation is everything in faith, how do we know we are on the right track and not being led astray?”
Let me begin with this statement “To be a Muslim is to be a peacemaker, one who constantly seeks to mitigate conflicts and nurtures goodwill for peaceful co-existence.” Indeed that is the purpose of all religions; to cause societies to practice justice and bring about peaceful co-existence. That is the bottom line message of God to keep his creation in balance per Qur’aan, Surah 49:13: "O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. The noblest of you, in sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Allah Knows and is Aware." Good conduct is that which removes conflict and causes peaceful co-existence.
If we can understand our faith from the above perspective then going astray would mean going away from the state of peaceful existence. The biggest hurdle is based in human weakness (regardless of what religion you subscribe to) of believing that my way is the best way while denying others their divinity. The vociferous Muslims (or vociferous from any faith) among us do not have the stomach to do their jihad and subdue arrogance. If we do that, then we cannot go astray. Arrogance and spirituality are inversely proportional.
The Islamic technicians of the past have reduced Islam to rituals without giving value to the essence of Islam – submitting to the will of God, which is peaceful existence. We are conditioned to see the practitioners of Islam in rituals, lack of it is automatic declaration of being a non-Muslim, and even a small deviation is not acceptable. It is a pity to see the Universal, all times Islam reduced to rituals.
If we can work on the above statement and develop a consensus, accept and respect the God given uniqueness of each one of the Seven billion of us, then conflicts fade and solutions emerge. The moderates among us need to have the passion to speak up and define the guidelines of what is the right track, that can apply to every human on the earth whether one subscribes to Islam (as given) or not. After all, God is not the exclusive property of any one and all religions make a point to say that God is one and that he is the God of everything we can perceive, imagine and see.
Tarek Fatah expresses the wisdom of religion well “Fatah argues that the only viable route is to separate religion from political affairs.” Indeed, we need to separate these two. Much of the conflict emanates from managing the resources (political) and fear that some one may deny you the right and may tempt one to pre-empt in denying other’s right. Religion (Islam or otherwise) teaches one to practice Justice and also shares the idea that everything is owned by God, as we did not bring it with us when we were born nor are we going to take with us.
I am yet to read the book, but agree with him when “he urges Muslims to seek a "state of Islam" within them”. Each one of us has a different approach to solutions, Fatah is confrontational and that approach simply reduces his embrace of possibly a larger audience. He may want to re-consider that. If we want to bring a change, we need to bring more people into our envelope.
Aisha writes “I was even to see some Muslims carry out atrocities in the name of God.” It is human to make mistakes, you will find same percentage of Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus or others carry out atrocities in the name of God. It is wrong to single out Muslims, all are guilty. In fact, the idea of – 1/10th of 1% of all people, however you categorize them are extremists, may have some validity.
The comment by Aisha’s Imam “Islam as a religion is perfect. But some Muslim people can be terrible!" Could have been wiser, “every religion intends to bring goodness, some followers are wicked” Some Muslims are terrible so are “some people of all faiths”. Bottom line: You are individually responsible for your acts, today, tomorrow and on the day of judgment.
Turning to Farazana’s book: Indeed, the Neocons are preempting Armageddon. Neocons are as relevant to the teachings of the Christ as the Islamists are to the Prophet Muhammad's teachings. Neither group understands the essence of the religion, instead they thrive on fear and are driven by an imaginary conquest.
The introduction by Dr. Akbar Ahmed is a huge endorsement of Farzana's work.
I have admired the articles and work of Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress who has taken a firm stand on moderation in approach that the Prophet taught, I hope and pray more and more Muslims join her in her Jihad to keep Islam pristine, simple, all embracing and peaceful
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. He is the founder of the World Muslim Congress, a group committed to building bridges and nurturing a world of co-existence. He also heads the foundation for pluralism, an organization committed to studying religious pluralism and pluralistic governance. His personal website is http://www.mikeghouse.net/ and his writings are on the above websites as well as several of the ancillary Blogs listed on the sites.
In the book review below, Aisha Sherazi has rightly pointed out the issues we have not dealt with, Insha Allah; I will make an attempt to responds to a few issues;
She writes “Which brings me to my initial point. If interpretation is everything in faith, how do we know we are on the right track and not being led astray?”
Let me begin with this statement “To be a Muslim is to be a peacemaker, one who constantly seeks to mitigate conflicts and nurtures goodwill for peaceful co-existence.” Indeed that is the purpose of all religions; to cause societies to practice justice and bring about peaceful co-existence. That is the bottom line message of God to keep his creation in balance per Qur’aan, Surah 49:13: "O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. The noblest of you, in sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Allah Knows and is Aware." Good conduct is that which removes conflict and causes peaceful co-existence.
If we can understand our faith from the above perspective then going astray would mean going away from the state of peaceful existence. The biggest hurdle is based in human weakness (regardless of what religion you subscribe to) of believing that my way is the best way while denying others their divinity. The vociferous Muslims (or vociferous from any faith) among us do not have the stomach to do their jihad and subdue arrogance. If we do that, then we cannot go astray. Arrogance and spirituality are inversely proportional.
The Islamic technicians of the past have reduced Islam to rituals without giving value to the essence of Islam – submitting to the will of God, which is peaceful existence. We are conditioned to see the practitioners of Islam in rituals, lack of it is automatic declaration of being a non-Muslim, and even a small deviation is not acceptable. It is a pity to see the Universal, all times Islam reduced to rituals.
If we can work on the above statement and develop a consensus, accept and respect the God given uniqueness of each one of the Seven billion of us, then conflicts fade and solutions emerge. The moderates among us need to have the passion to speak up and define the guidelines of what is the right track, that can apply to every human on the earth whether one subscribes to Islam (as given) or not. After all, God is not the exclusive property of any one and all religions make a point to say that God is one and that he is the God of everything we can perceive, imagine and see.
Tarek Fatah expresses the wisdom of religion well “Fatah argues that the only viable route is to separate religion from political affairs.” Indeed, we need to separate these two. Much of the conflict emanates from managing the resources (political) and fear that some one may deny you the right and may tempt one to pre-empt in denying other’s right. Religion (Islam or otherwise) teaches one to practice Justice and also shares the idea that everything is owned by God, as we did not bring it with us when we were born nor are we going to take with us.
I am yet to read the book, but agree with him when “he urges Muslims to seek a "state of Islam" within them”. Each one of us has a different approach to solutions, Fatah is confrontational and that approach simply reduces his embrace of possibly a larger audience. He may want to re-consider that. If we want to bring a change, we need to bring more people into our envelope.
Aisha writes “I was even to see some Muslims carry out atrocities in the name of God.” It is human to make mistakes, you will find same percentage of Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus or others carry out atrocities in the name of God. It is wrong to single out Muslims, all are guilty. In fact, the idea of – 1/10th of 1% of all people, however you categorize them are extremists, may have some validity.
The comment by Aisha’s Imam “Islam as a religion is perfect. But some Muslim people can be terrible!" Could have been wiser, “every religion intends to bring goodness, some followers are wicked” Some Muslims are terrible so are “some people of all faiths”. Bottom line: You are individually responsible for your acts, today, tomorrow and on the day of judgment.
Turning to Farazana’s book: Indeed, the Neocons are preempting Armageddon. Neocons are as relevant to the teachings of the Christ as the Islamists are to the Prophet Muhammad's teachings. Neither group understands the essence of the religion, instead they thrive on fear and are driven by an imaginary conquest.
The introduction by Dr. Akbar Ahmed is a huge endorsement of Farzana's work.
I have admired the articles and work of Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress who has taken a firm stand on moderation in approach that the Prophet taught, I hope and pray more and more Muslims join her in her Jihad to keep Islam pristine, simple, all embracing and peaceful
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. He is the founder of the World Muslim Congress, a group committed to building bridges and nurturing a world of co-existence. He also heads the foundation for pluralism, an organization committed to studying religious pluralism and pluralistic governance. His personal website is http://www.mikeghouse.net/ and his writings are on the above websites as well as several of the ancillary Blogs listed on the sites.
# # #
Islamic state, or state of Islam?
Two quite different books look at belief and practice
AISHA SHERAZI
The Montreal Gazette
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/books/story.html?id=d6f172b1-84dc-4159-a0dc-17cde43bb2bb
It was the summer of 1994. I sat in the office of the imam in London's Regent's Park mosque, and read my "shahada," or declaration of faith. I excitedly accepted Islam as my faith, and promised to worship one God and attest that Muhammad (peace be unto him) was His messenger.The imam who witnessed this declaration told me something I shall never forget. "Islam as a religion is perfect. But some Muslim people can be terrible!"
How wise his words turned out to be. In years to come, I was even to see some Muslims carry out atrocities in the name of God. The imam advised me to seek good company and steer away from those who would lead me astray.
Two new books by Canadian writers Tarek Fatah and Farzana Hassan reminded me of that time in my life and of the crucial question: What exactly does being "led astray" mean? How does the way we interpret faith affect how we practise it?
Many Muslims believe Islam to be a way of life that encompasses all aspects of their lives. Fatah's Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State, is a hard-hitting book that challenges Muslims to dispose of the dream of establishing a formal, political Islamic state that governs using Islamic principles and laws. Instead, he urges Muslims to seek a "state of Islam" within themselves, in more of a spiritual sense, and adopt a secular approach to everyday life.
Fatah, founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, takes the reader on a journey that reflects on how modern attempts to establish a so-called Islamic state have failed.
Fatah cites Pakistan (his birthplace and where he was jailed twice for his left-wing views as a student) and its failures to become the Islamic country it set out to be. Its failure to become a democracy (an Islamic principle) was the opening chapter in a long history of political turmoil and tragedy. He also analyzes the deep-set hypocrisies within the Islamic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran, where racial and tribal allegiances take precedence over piety. In addition, he tackles the topic of Palestine and acknowledges that Muslims collectively must clean up their own house before pointing the finger at anyone else.
He suggests how the Palestinian people can gain back some of their lost land by using Israeli contravention of UN Security Council resolutions as the basis for future peace talks, rather than by calls for an Islamist state.
Fatah's book goes on to challenge many ideas about what numerous Muslims call the golden era of Islam that followed the death of Muhammad. His historical analyses help the reader understand why he feels that Muslims never truly regained political or religious momentum after that tragic event. Fatah is deeply concerned that democratic principles were abandoned following the prophet's death, and the power struggle that ensued paved the way for the racial and tribal conflicts that still plague Muslims. Despite the bleak picture he paints, he also highlights the strengths of individual leaders and instances where justice was served.
Fatah argues that the only viable route is to separate religion from political affairs. However, while providing a detailed historical perspective about why an Islamic state has not worked thus far, Fatah's book falls short of providing solutions. Although many of his criticisms are justified, he doesn't really help the reader grasp how people should assimilate into western society. Immigrants from all backgrounds often feel that their cultural and religious habits define them as people. How does one help them adopt secularism comfortably?
In the third part of his book, Fatah tackles modern issues like jihadism, the hijab or veil, Sharia law and the overall Islamist Agenda (Fatah's term for Muslims who advocate Islam as a political creed, not just a religion) in the West. Here, sadly, he fails to write in a manner that will unite the secular and what he terms the Islamist sections of the Muslim community in the West. He points the finger at numerous organizations as being Islamist. However, rather than build bridges to those who could help him with his cause, I suspect he alienates many fellow Muslims with his accusatory style.
While Fatah's book appeals to a broad range of readers, Prophecy and the Fundamentalist Quest, the latest book by Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress, is probably more of interest to readers attracted to theological discussion. The book is well-researched and written, and uses many sources to compare and contrast Islam and Christianity and trace the origins of apocalyptic prophecy in both religions.
Hassan's book also deals with how religious fundamentalism can be used to push an end-agenda, marshalling prophetic scripture and other accounts to attain final religious supremacy. She warns how dangerous it can be to interpret such texts literally.
Perhaps the most poignant part of Hassan's book is when she parallels Christian and Islamic prophecies about the end of the world with what is happening globally today. She rightly points out that radical factions of both faiths claim to be the "good" that will triumph over the "evil."
Which brings me to my initial point. If interpretation is everything in faith, how do we know we are on the right track and not being led astray? Having read both books, I came to the conclusion that no matter on what path God has guided us and through whom, He has provided us with common values, such as compassion, love, truth, respect and justice. Though God is the ground from which these stem, faith crystallizes into organized religion, which can produce bitter fruits and devastating results if we don't remind ourselves of the root values that were sent to us all.
I thoroughly enjoyed both books, which challenge the heart as well as the mind, despite the fact that I didn't agree with everything the authors say.
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
By Tarek Fatah
John Wiley & Sons Canada,
432 pages, $31.95
Prophecy and the The Fundamentalist Quest
By Farzana Hassan
McFarland & Company,
185 pages, $35
Islamic state, or state of Islam?
Two quite different books look at belief and practice
AISHA SHERAZI
The Montreal Gazette
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/books/story.html?id=d6f172b1-84dc-4159-a0dc-17cde43bb2bb
It was the summer of 1994. I sat in the office of the imam in London's Regent's Park mosque, and read my "shahada," or declaration of faith. I excitedly accepted Islam as my faith, and promised to worship one God and attest that Muhammad (peace be unto him) was His messenger.The imam who witnessed this declaration told me something I shall never forget. "Islam as a religion is perfect. But some Muslim people can be terrible!"
How wise his words turned out to be. In years to come, I was even to see some Muslims carry out atrocities in the name of God. The imam advised me to seek good company and steer away from those who would lead me astray.
Two new books by Canadian writers Tarek Fatah and Farzana Hassan reminded me of that time in my life and of the crucial question: What exactly does being "led astray" mean? How does the way we interpret faith affect how we practise it?
Many Muslims believe Islam to be a way of life that encompasses all aspects of their lives. Fatah's Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State, is a hard-hitting book that challenges Muslims to dispose of the dream of establishing a formal, political Islamic state that governs using Islamic principles and laws. Instead, he urges Muslims to seek a "state of Islam" within themselves, in more of a spiritual sense, and adopt a secular approach to everyday life.
Fatah, founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, takes the reader on a journey that reflects on how modern attempts to establish a so-called Islamic state have failed.
Fatah cites Pakistan (his birthplace and where he was jailed twice for his left-wing views as a student) and its failures to become the Islamic country it set out to be. Its failure to become a democracy (an Islamic principle) was the opening chapter in a long history of political turmoil and tragedy. He also analyzes the deep-set hypocrisies within the Islamic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran, where racial and tribal allegiances take precedence over piety. In addition, he tackles the topic of Palestine and acknowledges that Muslims collectively must clean up their own house before pointing the finger at anyone else.
He suggests how the Palestinian people can gain back some of their lost land by using Israeli contravention of UN Security Council resolutions as the basis for future peace talks, rather than by calls for an Islamist state.
Fatah's book goes on to challenge many ideas about what numerous Muslims call the golden era of Islam that followed the death of Muhammad. His historical analyses help the reader understand why he feels that Muslims never truly regained political or religious momentum after that tragic event. Fatah is deeply concerned that democratic principles were abandoned following the prophet's death, and the power struggle that ensued paved the way for the racial and tribal conflicts that still plague Muslims. Despite the bleak picture he paints, he also highlights the strengths of individual leaders and instances where justice was served.
Fatah argues that the only viable route is to separate religion from political affairs. However, while providing a detailed historical perspective about why an Islamic state has not worked thus far, Fatah's book falls short of providing solutions. Although many of his criticisms are justified, he doesn't really help the reader grasp how people should assimilate into western society. Immigrants from all backgrounds often feel that their cultural and religious habits define them as people. How does one help them adopt secularism comfortably?
In the third part of his book, Fatah tackles modern issues like jihadism, the hijab or veil, Sharia law and the overall Islamist Agenda (Fatah's term for Muslims who advocate Islam as a political creed, not just a religion) in the West. Here, sadly, he fails to write in a manner that will unite the secular and what he terms the Islamist sections of the Muslim community in the West. He points the finger at numerous organizations as being Islamist. However, rather than build bridges to those who could help him with his cause, I suspect he alienates many fellow Muslims with his accusatory style.
While Fatah's book appeals to a broad range of readers, Prophecy and the Fundamentalist Quest, the latest book by Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress, is probably more of interest to readers attracted to theological discussion. The book is well-researched and written, and uses many sources to compare and contrast Islam and Christianity and trace the origins of apocalyptic prophecy in both religions.
Hassan's book also deals with how religious fundamentalism can be used to push an end-agenda, marshalling prophetic scripture and other accounts to attain final religious supremacy. She warns how dangerous it can be to interpret such texts literally.
Perhaps the most poignant part of Hassan's book is when she parallels Christian and Islamic prophecies about the end of the world with what is happening globally today. She rightly points out that radical factions of both faiths claim to be the "good" that will triumph over the "evil."
Which brings me to my initial point. If interpretation is everything in faith, how do we know we are on the right track and not being led astray? Having read both books, I came to the conclusion that no matter on what path God has guided us and through whom, He has provided us with common values, such as compassion, love, truth, respect and justice. Though God is the ground from which these stem, faith crystallizes into organized religion, which can produce bitter fruits and devastating results if we don't remind ourselves of the root values that were sent to us all.
I thoroughly enjoyed both books, which challenge the heart as well as the mind, despite the fact that I didn't agree with everything the authors say.
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
By Tarek Fatah
John Wiley & Sons Canada,
432 pages, $31.95
Prophecy and the The Fundamentalist Quest
By Farzana Hassan
McFarland & Company,
185 pages, $35
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Critiquing Islamism and Maududi
Article by Yogi Sikand follows my commentary;
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/05/critiquing-islamism-and-maududi.html
Yogi, Thanks for posting yet another piece that opens the windows to “exploring” the truth. Finding the truth is one’s own responsibility.
I am glad to see Muslims unhesitatingly critiquing the revered Muslims scholars of the past, we need to sort out the truth from the bunk and there is plenty of it, that is being unraveled now and Insha Allah, in the next decade we must be able to take out the additives by reverend Maududi, Qutub, Hilali and their likes who sought political gains through religion. Political Islam is a human endeavor to dominate, influence and control others, possibly out of fear of being run over or to cash in on the fear. It is the same story with Zionism, Hindutva and Neocons, agents of fear and war mongering.
Truthfully following the religion comes when we have the freedom to question what is given to us. When we lose that freedom, we fall into the trap of distancing ourselves from the truth. Prophet Muhammad did not assign any one to run the religion for Muslims; it was up to the individual to follow the guidelines enshrined in Qur’aan which is the only thing he left to the followers in his last speech. Respectfully the Shia version assigns an interpreter of religion and it was taken as a hereditary Imamat – it works for them and the other system works for the Sunni traditionalist. Prophet Muhammad completed the religion and no one needed to carry it forward, it was the finality of the message, there was no more delegation of religious authority.
Neither the Prophet assigned the governance of the state to any one that would have led to a monarchial form of governance. The consultative form was adopted for the political governance of the state and it was followed with the first four Leaders. Abdul Aziz Sachedina calls it the roots of democracy.
Religion is a private matter between an individual and God, as no one, not even the Prophet is responsible for one’s good and bad deeds, it is the individual responsibility, he or she alone faces the consequences on the day of Judgment, as such no state has the right to regulate one’s faith matters. As a civil society we honor the general guidelines and rules of the society, and can regulate those acts that affect others in terms of crime and punishment.
“Thus, he (Nadwi) accuses Maududi of wrongly equating the Islamic duty of 'establishing religion' with the setting up of an Islamic state with God as Sovereign and Law Maker. At Maududi's hands, he says, 'God', 'The Sustainer', 'Religion' and 'Worship' have all been reduced to political concepts.”
“Thus, he (Nadwi) argued, Maududi's insistence that to accept the commands of anyone other than God, including of an elected government, was tantamount to shirk, the crime of associating others with God, as this was allegedly akin to 'worship', was not in keeping with the teachings of Islam.”.
The above idea seem like etched in stone… it will take a lot of time and research to undo this set notions among a few Muslims, who are in-charge of running the affairs of Muslim communities, oddly the majority of Muslims will not subscribe to it in the privacy of their hearts and minds. Prophet lived in a pluralistic society, and he was sensitive to other humans that God wanted us to understand and live with, he took the initiative of Madinah pact and examples abound of his respect (not agree) for others. Where as some of the Islamic scholars did not live in such an environment and their views are certainly biased, although Maududi lived in such a society; India, perhaps he ignored Allah’s instructions given in Al-Hujurat, Surah 49:13.
“Further, Maulana Nadwi asserted that Maududi's argument that God had sent prophets to the world charged with the mission of establishing an 'Islamic state' was a misreading of the Islamic concept of prophethood.”
“In Maududi's understanding of Islam, he wrote, prayer and remembrance of God are seen as simply the means to an end, the establishment of an Islamic state, whereas, Maulana Nadwi argued, the converse is true.”.
If Maududi meant Islamic state to mean just governance, then it is fine, but if he meant suppression of those who differ and make them second class citizens, then it is dangerous and militaristic, and goes against the very grain of Islam – that is to create peaceful and just societies. We have to undo this thought.
“Maulana Nadwi's critique of radical Islamism points to the rich theological resources contained within traditional Islamic thought that can be used to fashion alternate understandings of the relationship between Islam and politics in a far more sensible way than most Islamists have articulated hitherto and which have caused untold havoc in the name of Islam.”
Yogi has concluded this very well with the above thought. Indeed that is the basis for Ijtihad. We should not settle for the opinions of scholars from yesteryears, and revisit them and re-affirm or re-evaluate in present context. Islam is for all times.
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. His comments, news analysis, opinions and columns can be found on the Websites and Blogs listed at his personal website www.MikeGhouse.net. He can be reached at MikeGhouse@aol.com
# # #
Maulana Nadwi has rightly criticized Maulana
Nadwi on Maududi: A Traditionalist Maulvi's Critique of Islamism
By Yoginder Sikand, TwoCircles.net
The late Sayyed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (or Ali Miyan as he was also known) was one of the leading Indian ulema of modern times. A noted writer, he headed the famous Nadwat ul-Ulema madrasa in Lucknow from 1961 till his death in 1999. He was associated with several other Indian as well as international Islamic organisations, a mark of the high respect that he was accorded among Muslims all over the world.
Maulana Nadwi's wrote extensively on a vast range of subjects, including on Islam and politics. On this issue, his views underwent a gradual process of change and maturation, beginning with his early association with a leading Indian Islamist formation and later making a forceful critique of some crucial aspects of its understanding of Islam. His views in this regard point to the little-known yet rich internal debate among Indian Muslim scholars about the relationship between Islam and politics, particularly on the question of what Islamists describe as an 'Islamic state'.
In 1940, Maulana Nadwi came under the influence of Sayyid Maududi, the founder of the principal Indian Islamist outfit, the Jamaat-i Islami. Maududi, along with the Egyptian Syed Qutb, may be said to be among the pioneers of contemporary Islamism. Soon after joining the Jamaat, Maulana Nadwi was put in-charge of its activities in Lucknow. This relationship proved short-lived, however, and he left the Jamaat in 1943. He later wrote that he was disillusioned by the perception that many members of the Jamaat were going to what he called 'extremes' in adoring and glorifying Maududi as almost infallible, this bordering on personality worship'. At the same time, he felt that many Jamaat activists believed that they had nothing at all to learn from any other scholars of Islam. He was also concerned with what he saw as a lack of personal piety in Maududi and some leading Jamaat activists and with their criticism of other Muslim groups.
Maulana Nadwi's opposition to the Jamaat's understanding about Islam and politics, which it shared with most other Islamist formations, comes out clearly in his Urdu book Asr-i Hazir Mai Din Ki Tahfim-o-Tashrih ('Understanding and Explaining Religion in the Contemporary Age') which he penned in 1978, and which won him, so he says in his introduction to its second edition published in 1980, fierce condemnation from leading members of the Jamaat. Here, Maulana Nadwi takes Maududi to task for having allegedly misinterpreted central Islamic beliefs in order to suit his own
political agenda, presenting Islam, he says, as little more than a political programme. Thus, he accuses Maududi of wrongly equating the Islamic duty of 'establishing religion' with the setting up of an Islamic state with God as Sovereign and Law Maker. At Maududi's hands, he says, 'God', 'The Sustainer', 'Religion' and 'Worship' have all been reduced to political concepts. In this way, Maududi, Maulana Nadwi says, sought to incorrectly suggest that Islam is simply about
political power and that the relationship between God and human beings is only that between an All-Powerful King and His subjects. However, Maulana Nadwi says, this relationship is also one of 'love' and 'realisation of the Truth', which is far more comprehensive than what Maududi envisages.
Linked to Maulana Nadwi's critique of Maududi for having allegedly reduced Islam to a mere political project was his concern that not only was such an approach a distortion of the actual import of the Quran but also that it was impractical, if not dangerous, in the Indian context. Thus, he argued, Maududi's insistence that to accept the commands of anyone other than God, including of an elected government, was tantamount to shirk, the crime of associating others with God, as this was allegedly akin to 'worship', was not in keeping with the teachings of Islam. God, Maulana Nadwi wrote, had, in His
wisdom, left several areas of life free for people to decide how they could govern them, within the broad limits set by the
Islamic law or shariah, and guided by a concern for social welfare.
Further, Maulana Nadwi asserted that Maududi's argument that God had sent prophets to the world charged with the mission of establishing an 'Islamic state' was a misreading of the Islamic concept of prophethood. The principal work of the prophets, Maulana Nadwi argued, was to preach the worship of the one God and to exhort others to do good deeds. Not all prophets were rulers. In fact, only a few of them were granted that status. Maulana Nadwi faulted
Maududi for what he said was 'debasing' the 'lofty' Islamic understanding of worship to mean simply 'training' people as willing subjects of the Islamic state. In Maududi's understanding of Islam, he wrote, prayer and remembrance of God are seen as simply the means to an end, the establishment of an Islamic state, whereas, Maulana Nadwi argued, the converse is true. The goal of the Islamic state is to ensure worship of God, and not the other way round. If at all worship
can be said to be a means, he added, it is a means for securing the 'will of God' and 'closeness to Him'.
If the 'Islamic state' should then simply a means for the 'establishment of religion' and not the 'total religion' or the 'primary objective' of Islam, it opens up the possibility of pursuing the same goals through other means. Maulana Nadwi
refers to this when he says that the objective of the 'establishment of the faith' needs to be pursued along with 'wisdom of the faith', using constructive, as opposed to destructive, means. Eschewing 'total opposition', Muslims striving for the 'establishment of the faith' should, he wrote, unhesitatingly adopt peaceful means such as 'understanding and reform', 'consultation' and 'wisdom'. Critiquing the use of uncalled for violence by some groups calling themselves 'Islamic', Maulana Nadwi stressed the need for 'obedience', 'love' and 'faith' and struggle against the 'base self' (nafs). Muslims
should, he wrote, make use of all available legitimate spaces to pursue the cause of the 'establishment of religion', such as propagating their message through literature, public discussions, training volunteers, winning others over with the force of one's own personality and establishing contacts with governments.
Maulana Nadwi's critique of radical Islamism points to the rich theological resources contained within traditional Islamic thought that can be used to fashion alternate understandings of the relationship between Islam and politics in a far more sensible way than most Islamists have articulated hitherto and which have caused untold havoc in the name of Islam.
Book Info: Sayyed Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, 'Asr-i Hazir Mai Din Ki
Tahfim-o-Tashrih, Dar-ul 'Arafat, Lucknow. 1980 edition.
--
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/05/critiquing-islamism-and-maududi.html
Yogi, Thanks for posting yet another piece that opens the windows to “exploring” the truth. Finding the truth is one’s own responsibility.
I am glad to see Muslims unhesitatingly critiquing the revered Muslims scholars of the past, we need to sort out the truth from the bunk and there is plenty of it, that is being unraveled now and Insha Allah, in the next decade we must be able to take out the additives by reverend Maududi, Qutub, Hilali and their likes who sought political gains through religion. Political Islam is a human endeavor to dominate, influence and control others, possibly out of fear of being run over or to cash in on the fear. It is the same story with Zionism, Hindutva and Neocons, agents of fear and war mongering.
Truthfully following the religion comes when we have the freedom to question what is given to us. When we lose that freedom, we fall into the trap of distancing ourselves from the truth. Prophet Muhammad did not assign any one to run the religion for Muslims; it was up to the individual to follow the guidelines enshrined in Qur’aan which is the only thing he left to the followers in his last speech. Respectfully the Shia version assigns an interpreter of religion and it was taken as a hereditary Imamat – it works for them and the other system works for the Sunni traditionalist. Prophet Muhammad completed the religion and no one needed to carry it forward, it was the finality of the message, there was no more delegation of religious authority.
Neither the Prophet assigned the governance of the state to any one that would have led to a monarchial form of governance. The consultative form was adopted for the political governance of the state and it was followed with the first four Leaders. Abdul Aziz Sachedina calls it the roots of democracy.
Religion is a private matter between an individual and God, as no one, not even the Prophet is responsible for one’s good and bad deeds, it is the individual responsibility, he or she alone faces the consequences on the day of Judgment, as such no state has the right to regulate one’s faith matters. As a civil society we honor the general guidelines and rules of the society, and can regulate those acts that affect others in terms of crime and punishment.
“Thus, he (Nadwi) accuses Maududi of wrongly equating the Islamic duty of 'establishing religion' with the setting up of an Islamic state with God as Sovereign and Law Maker. At Maududi's hands, he says, 'God', 'The Sustainer', 'Religion' and 'Worship' have all been reduced to political concepts.”
“Thus, he (Nadwi) argued, Maududi's insistence that to accept the commands of anyone other than God, including of an elected government, was tantamount to shirk, the crime of associating others with God, as this was allegedly akin to 'worship', was not in keeping with the teachings of Islam.”.
The above idea seem like etched in stone… it will take a lot of time and research to undo this set notions among a few Muslims, who are in-charge of running the affairs of Muslim communities, oddly the majority of Muslims will not subscribe to it in the privacy of their hearts and minds. Prophet lived in a pluralistic society, and he was sensitive to other humans that God wanted us to understand and live with, he took the initiative of Madinah pact and examples abound of his respect (not agree) for others. Where as some of the Islamic scholars did not live in such an environment and their views are certainly biased, although Maududi lived in such a society; India, perhaps he ignored Allah’s instructions given in Al-Hujurat, Surah 49:13.
“Further, Maulana Nadwi asserted that Maududi's argument that God had sent prophets to the world charged with the mission of establishing an 'Islamic state' was a misreading of the Islamic concept of prophethood.”
“In Maududi's understanding of Islam, he wrote, prayer and remembrance of God are seen as simply the means to an end, the establishment of an Islamic state, whereas, Maulana Nadwi argued, the converse is true.”.
If Maududi meant Islamic state to mean just governance, then it is fine, but if he meant suppression of those who differ and make them second class citizens, then it is dangerous and militaristic, and goes against the very grain of Islam – that is to create peaceful and just societies. We have to undo this thought.
“Maulana Nadwi's critique of radical Islamism points to the rich theological resources contained within traditional Islamic thought that can be used to fashion alternate understandings of the relationship between Islam and politics in a far more sensible way than most Islamists have articulated hitherto and which have caused untold havoc in the name of Islam.”
Yogi has concluded this very well with the above thought. Indeed that is the basis for Ijtihad. We should not settle for the opinions of scholars from yesteryears, and revisit them and re-affirm or re-evaluate in present context. Islam is for all times.
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. His comments, news analysis, opinions and columns can be found on the Websites and Blogs listed at his personal website www.MikeGhouse.net. He can be reached at MikeGhouse@aol.com
# # #
Maulana Nadwi has rightly criticized Maulana
Nadwi on Maududi: A Traditionalist Maulvi's Critique of Islamism
By Yoginder Sikand, TwoCircles.net
The late Sayyed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (or Ali Miyan as he was also known) was one of the leading Indian ulema of modern times. A noted writer, he headed the famous Nadwat ul-Ulema madrasa in Lucknow from 1961 till his death in 1999. He was associated with several other Indian as well as international Islamic organisations, a mark of the high respect that he was accorded among Muslims all over the world.
Maulana Nadwi's wrote extensively on a vast range of subjects, including on Islam and politics. On this issue, his views underwent a gradual process of change and maturation, beginning with his early association with a leading Indian Islamist formation and later making a forceful critique of some crucial aspects of its understanding of Islam. His views in this regard point to the little-known yet rich internal debate among Indian Muslim scholars about the relationship between Islam and politics, particularly on the question of what Islamists describe as an 'Islamic state'.
In 1940, Maulana Nadwi came under the influence of Sayyid Maududi, the founder of the principal Indian Islamist outfit, the Jamaat-i Islami. Maududi, along with the Egyptian Syed Qutb, may be said to be among the pioneers of contemporary Islamism. Soon after joining the Jamaat, Maulana Nadwi was put in-charge of its activities in Lucknow. This relationship proved short-lived, however, and he left the Jamaat in 1943. He later wrote that he was disillusioned by the perception that many members of the Jamaat were going to what he called 'extremes' in adoring and glorifying Maududi as almost infallible, this bordering on personality worship'. At the same time, he felt that many Jamaat activists believed that they had nothing at all to learn from any other scholars of Islam. He was also concerned with what he saw as a lack of personal piety in Maududi and some leading Jamaat activists and with their criticism of other Muslim groups.
Maulana Nadwi's opposition to the Jamaat's understanding about Islam and politics, which it shared with most other Islamist formations, comes out clearly in his Urdu book Asr-i Hazir Mai Din Ki Tahfim-o-Tashrih ('Understanding and Explaining Religion in the Contemporary Age') which he penned in 1978, and which won him, so he says in his introduction to its second edition published in 1980, fierce condemnation from leading members of the Jamaat. Here, Maulana Nadwi takes Maududi to task for having allegedly misinterpreted central Islamic beliefs in order to suit his own
political agenda, presenting Islam, he says, as little more than a political programme. Thus, he accuses Maududi of wrongly equating the Islamic duty of 'establishing religion' with the setting up of an Islamic state with God as Sovereign and Law Maker. At Maududi's hands, he says, 'God', 'The Sustainer', 'Religion' and 'Worship' have all been reduced to political concepts. In this way, Maududi, Maulana Nadwi says, sought to incorrectly suggest that Islam is simply about
political power and that the relationship between God and human beings is only that between an All-Powerful King and His subjects. However, Maulana Nadwi says, this relationship is also one of 'love' and 'realisation of the Truth', which is far more comprehensive than what Maududi envisages.
Linked to Maulana Nadwi's critique of Maududi for having allegedly reduced Islam to a mere political project was his concern that not only was such an approach a distortion of the actual import of the Quran but also that it was impractical, if not dangerous, in the Indian context. Thus, he argued, Maududi's insistence that to accept the commands of anyone other than God, including of an elected government, was tantamount to shirk, the crime of associating others with God, as this was allegedly akin to 'worship', was not in keeping with the teachings of Islam. God, Maulana Nadwi wrote, had, in His
wisdom, left several areas of life free for people to decide how they could govern them, within the broad limits set by the
Islamic law or shariah, and guided by a concern for social welfare.
Further, Maulana Nadwi asserted that Maududi's argument that God had sent prophets to the world charged with the mission of establishing an 'Islamic state' was a misreading of the Islamic concept of prophethood. The principal work of the prophets, Maulana Nadwi argued, was to preach the worship of the one God and to exhort others to do good deeds. Not all prophets were rulers. In fact, only a few of them were granted that status. Maulana Nadwi faulted
Maududi for what he said was 'debasing' the 'lofty' Islamic understanding of worship to mean simply 'training' people as willing subjects of the Islamic state. In Maududi's understanding of Islam, he wrote, prayer and remembrance of God are seen as simply the means to an end, the establishment of an Islamic state, whereas, Maulana Nadwi argued, the converse is true. The goal of the Islamic state is to ensure worship of God, and not the other way round. If at all worship
can be said to be a means, he added, it is a means for securing the 'will of God' and 'closeness to Him'.
If the 'Islamic state' should then simply a means for the 'establishment of religion' and not the 'total religion' or the 'primary objective' of Islam, it opens up the possibility of pursuing the same goals through other means. Maulana Nadwi
refers to this when he says that the objective of the 'establishment of the faith' needs to be pursued along with 'wisdom of the faith', using constructive, as opposed to destructive, means. Eschewing 'total opposition', Muslims striving for the 'establishment of the faith' should, he wrote, unhesitatingly adopt peaceful means such as 'understanding and reform', 'consultation' and 'wisdom'. Critiquing the use of uncalled for violence by some groups calling themselves 'Islamic', Maulana Nadwi stressed the need for 'obedience', 'love' and 'faith' and struggle against the 'base self' (nafs). Muslims
should, he wrote, make use of all available legitimate spaces to pursue the cause of the 'establishment of religion', such as propagating their message through literature, public discussions, training volunteers, winning others over with the force of one's own personality and establishing contacts with governments.
Maulana Nadwi's critique of radical Islamism points to the rich theological resources contained within traditional Islamic thought that can be used to fashion alternate understandings of the relationship between Islam and politics in a far more sensible way than most Islamists have articulated hitherto and which have caused untold havoc in the name of Islam.
Book Info: Sayyed Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, 'Asr-i Hazir Mai Din Ki
Tahfim-o-Tashrih, Dar-ul 'Arafat, Lucknow. 1980 edition.
--
Saturday, May 3, 2008
Fall-Rise of Islamic State
Noah Feldman wrote another master piece in March - and it is a must read to understand Sharia, it is at: http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-shariah.htmlMike Ghouse
# # #
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State
By Noah Feldman
May 1st 2008
From The Economist print edition
The slogans of political Islam remain highly resonant, whether as a programme for peaceful governance or an inspiration to wage war. Two new books explain why
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda
By Mark Juergensmeyer
WHEN the British and French empires were at their height, imperial service often provided an outlet for the talents of precociously clever ethnographers, social anthropologists and scholars of religion. On the face of things, Noah Feldman is a similar figure, rendering important services to the American imperium, both as a rising star in the intellectual establishment and in more practical ways—he helped to draft Iraq's new constitution.
A young professor at Harvard Law School with a doctorate in Islamic political thought, Mr Feldman is brimming with the sort of expertise that America's new proconsuls in the Middle East and Afghanistan badly need. Above all, he is qualified to opine on how America should react to the dilemma posed by the huge popular support, in Muslim lands, for explicitly Islamic forms of administration.
In a short, incisive and elegant book, he lays out for the non-specialist reader some of the forms that Islamic rule has taken over the centuries, while also stressing the differences between today's political Islam and previous forms of Islamic administration. In particular, he shows why “justice” is such a resonant slogan for Islamist movements. At least subliminally, it evokes memories of a dimly remembered era when Islamic law, as interpreted by scholars, acted as a real constraint on the power of rulers. To many Muslims, the legal tradition of their faith is not viewed as an alternative to Western democracy, based on secular law, but rather as the only real alternative to totalitarianism.
That perceived dilemma—either Muslim law and scholarship, or unfettered dictatorship—is not just a hangover from history; it also reflects the fact that many secular regimes which replaced traditional Muslim empires were dictatorships, with no separation of powers.
So far, that is a familiar argument. Mr Feldman becomes more interesting when he shows how the Ottoman empire, in its efforts to modernise while retaining some Islamic legitimacy, almost unavoidably grew more dictatorial and less Islamic.
The very fact that Islamic law was codified implied a downgrading in the authority of Muslim scholars; their task had been to apply a set of abstract, unwritten principles to an infinite variety of situations, and the written law code risked putting them out of a job. When the Ottoman sultan-caliph tried some cautious constitutional experiments in 1876, it appeared to his pious subjects that he was undermining God's sovereignty. This was not so much because the experiments seemed bad, but because constitutional change implied that an earthly ruler could tinker with systems that had been divinely ordained.
The modernising challenges facing the late Ottoman era dimly foreshadow, as Mr Feldman demonstrates, some of the problems of modern political Islam. But there are differences: the Islamists of today are not trying to reinstate the power of the scholars, which was a hallmark of all previous Islamic regimes. Instead, what modern Islamism proposes is an odd mix of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of God; as though the people, having been offered sovereign power, freely decide to render that power straight back to God.
Another of Mr Feldman's paradoxes: any modern constitution or legal code that consciously proclaims its intention to be Islamic and deferential to God, will fall short of the early Islamic ideal, where the sovereignty of God was so deeply assumed that it did not need spelling out.
Mr Feldman's book is more descriptive than prescriptive. But many readers may conclude that in Islam's heartland only forms of governance that incorporate Muslim values can hope to be legitimate. If secularism has been imposed in many places by dictatorial methods, that is not because the secular rulers were gratuitously cruel; it was because secular principles had little hope of gaining spontaneous popular assent.
One huge question, unanswered by this book, is how minorities—practitioners of other religions or none—can expect to fare in countries where a form of political Islam is practised by the will of the majority. Even if the Islamic majority offers its non-Muslim compatriots generous forms of cultural autonomy, the infidel minorities can hardly be anything more than second-class subjects of an Islamic realm.
Whereas Mr Feldman's argument is about Islamic principles as a basis for creating stable, legitimate regimes, Mark Juergensmeyer, a professor of sociology and religious thought at the University of California, Santa Barbara, highlights the odd fact that the slogans of Islam, and other religions, are more effective than any secular battle-cry as a way of rallying people to wage war, or at least to live in armed readiness. Mixing analysis with reportage, he describes encounters with the leaders of Hamas, and with Jewish zealots who cheer the killing of Palestinians. He traces the advent of Hindu bigotry as a force in Indian politics and the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka's conflict.
Any book that takes in such a sweep is bound to have errors of detail. But it is more than a minor error to describe the first decade of the Soviet communist regime as “relatively tolerant” towards religion. Still, Mr Juergensmeyer is right in his broader point—that in the early 21st century, religion retains a mobilising power that secular nationalism and universalist ideologies like Marxism have lost. If you are trying to make people risk their own lives and take the lives of others, then calling the enemy “infidels” (or, literally, demonising them) is more effective than calling them foreigners or class enemies.
In each of these books, there is at least one lacuna. Having made the fair point that scholarship and modern political Islam don't easily mix, Mr Feldman should have said something about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the hugely influential and telegenic sheikh based in Qatar who seems to straddle both those worlds quite happily.
Mr Juergensmeyer distinguishes between the effects of secular nationalism and transnational religion, but he says little about religious nationalism, the opportunistic but effective combination of these two supposed opposites. As any thieving Balkan warlord knows, decent people often kill in the name of a half-forgotten national cause and for a religion in which they hardly believe. Using both tricks at once is especially effective.
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.
By Noah Feldman.
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda.
By Mark Juergensmeyer.
University of California Press; 384 pages; $27.50 and £16.95
Sunday, April 27, 2008
Indonesia going conservative?
Indonesia going conservative
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/04/indonesia-going-conservative.html
Even the ultra-liberals would resist the idea of non-restrictive copulation between adults; some one has to bear the consequences of such acts. They may silently and reluctantly accept it, but will not put a bill board to encourage others to participate in such an activity.
It is a wrong idea to assume that, it is the religion that restricts sex outside of marriage. Even if we do not have an organized religion, these rules would have evolved and become a part of a society. It becomes even more important to encourage responsibility given the STD’s, Pregnancies, and Caring for the children born out of irresponsibility, dependencies and abortion. One irresponsible act can produce a series of undesirable situations.
However, being conservative sounds like patriarchal, where some one wants to control how others behave, the re-evolving ‘conservatism’ in Indonesia is fraught with patriarchal attitudes, thanks God it is in the evolving state, it can be checked.
The idea of placing chastity lock assumes women are at fault; actually it is the men who initiate and beg for non-customary favors. By the way the same logic applies when men want to keep the women from the public eye. There was a time in history where the woman was required to die with the husband, and the kings used to put chastity locks on their wives when they went out conquering lands; such was the control exercised by the conservative, insecure men. It is time; we men grow up and feel confident in our relationships.
The laws should be based on treating humanity on an equal footing. No should be assumed to be superior or inferior. Qur'aan, "Men and Women are each others garments". Just as the garments shield one from the cold and heat, the metaphor encompasses every aspect of life including the vows; in happiness and sorrow, sickness and health, poverty or wealth, weakness or strength, difficulties and comforts, men and women are indeed each other's garment. No matter what faith or culture you follow, the essence of the vows is the same; justice. (http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/03/gender-equality-now.html )
Immorality stems from social injustice, in this situation, the men assume that the women need money and they can trade services, the assumption is based on social injustice where one takes advantage of the other, which leads to other imbalances in the society and depriving the members from security, peace and prosperity.
I hope Indonesia re-evaluates the idea and initiates the programs where the root cause for such thinking is burned out and every individual to immorality is assigned equal responsibility.
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. He is the founder of the World Muslim Congress, a group committed to building bridges and nurturing a world of co-existence. He also heads the foundation for pluralism, an organization committed to studying religious pluralism and pluralistic governance. His personal website is http://www.mikeghouse.net/ and his writings are on the above websites as well as several of the ancillary Blogs listed on the sites.
# # # # #
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/04/indonesia-going-conservative.html Even the ultra-liberals would resist the idea of non-restrictive copulation between adults; some one has to bear the consequences of such acts. They may silently and reluctantly accept it, but will not put a bill board to encourage others to participate in such an activity.
It is a wrong idea to assume that, it is the religion that restricts sex outside of marriage. Even if we do not have an organized religion, these rules would have evolved and become a part of a society. It becomes even more important to encourage responsibility given the STD’s, Pregnancies, and Caring for the children born out of irresponsibility, dependencies and abortion. One irresponsible act can produce a series of undesirable situations.
However, being conservative sounds like patriarchal, where some one wants to control how others behave, the re-evolving ‘conservatism’ in Indonesia is fraught with patriarchal attitudes, thanks God it is in the evolving state, it can be checked.
The idea of placing chastity lock assumes women are at fault; actually it is the men who initiate and beg for non-customary favors. By the way the same logic applies when men want to keep the women from the public eye. There was a time in history where the woman was required to die with the husband, and the kings used to put chastity locks on their wives when they went out conquering lands; such was the control exercised by the conservative, insecure men. It is time; we men grow up and feel confident in our relationships.
The laws should be based on treating humanity on an equal footing. No should be assumed to be superior or inferior. Qur'aan, "Men and Women are each others garments". Just as the garments shield one from the cold and heat, the metaphor encompasses every aspect of life including the vows; in happiness and sorrow, sickness and health, poverty or wealth, weakness or strength, difficulties and comforts, men and women are indeed each other's garment. No matter what faith or culture you follow, the essence of the vows is the same; justice. (http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/03/gender-equality-now.html )
Immorality stems from social injustice, in this situation, the men assume that the women need money and they can trade services, the assumption is based on social injustice where one takes advantage of the other, which leads to other imbalances in the society and depriving the members from security, peace and prosperity.
I hope Indonesia re-evaluates the idea and initiates the programs where the root cause for such thinking is burned out and every individual to immorality is assigned equal responsibility.
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. He is the founder of the World Muslim Congress, a group committed to building bridges and nurturing a world of co-existence. He also heads the foundation for pluralism, an organization committed to studying religious pluralism and pluralistic governance. His personal website is http://www.mikeghouse.net/ and his writings are on the above websites as well as several of the ancillary Blogs listed on the sites.
# # # # #
Indonesia going conservative
Chastity belts open debate on Indonesia's growing conservatism
Massage parlor owners say they need to protect their workers. Critics say that's offensive to women.
By Paul Watson, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-chastity27apr27,1,2065344.story
April 27, 2008
JAKARTA, INDONESIA -- Chastity belts, which went out of fashion with knights in shining armor and damsels in distress, are making a comeback in the massage parlors of East Java.
In a bid to prevent any hanky-panky between masseuses and their clients, several massage parlors in the hill resort town of Batu are insisting that the women wear padlocks across the zippers of their work pants.
Franky Setiawan, owner of Doghado Massage Parlor, says he came up with the idea when men "bombarded" his staff with demands for sex after local authorities shut down the town's brothels. In recent years, conservative Islamic values have gained influence in a society that has long enjoyed liberal freedoms, such as easy access to alcohol, gambling and the sex trade.
"We had a hard time rejecting this kind of client because they try over and over and over again, persuading our workers with their dangerously sweet words," Setiawan said by phone this month from Batu, explaining that he wanted his 14 masseuses to feel safe and morally upstanding, while protecting the massage industry's image.
But Meutia Fardia Hatta Swasono, minister for women's empowerment in the world's most populous Muslim nation, calls the return of the chastity belt an affront to all women.
"It is not the right way to prevent promiscuity. It insults women as if they are the ones in the wrong," she told reporters this month. "It is not that we oppose the administration's effort to uphold morality, but the problem is their way of treating masseuses as if they're all committing prostitution."
A 27-year-old masseuse, who identified herself only as Sani, said she knew that padlocked pants came with the job at Setiawan's place when she joined 18 months ago, "so it's nothing special."
"We find it comfortable wearing them," said the mother of two children.
A clothing designer before getting into the massage business in 2000, Setiawan called on his garment-making skills to create his lockable uniform.
The chastity belts of Renaissance Europe were often bulky contraptions made of iron plates, maybe with the rough edges taken off by touches of velvet or leather. Setiawan wanted something much more minimalist.
"I considered the fashion trend when designing the uniform," he said.
He settled on black pants that zip up at the side, where a padlock is slipped through two cloth loops and snapped shut each time a masseuse meets a client.
The uniform includes a red blouse worn each day except Mondays and Fridays, the Muslim holy day, when his employees wear batik shirts. All of them have zippers up the back, which remain unlocked, Setiawan said.
He stores the padlocks and keys in a special box at the cashier's counter. When a customer arrives for a massage, given in a private room behind a curtain, the "cashier calls one masseuse, asks her to prepare things and locks her pants," Setiawan said. "Because the masseuse knows the drill, she usually pees before that. And when the client is done, the masseuse comes to the cashier, and the cashier opens the padlock."
Once in a while, Setiawan said, he checks once in a while to make sure no one lifts the keys to cut copies.
Locking up women's pants seemed such an elegant solution, Setiawan suggested that other massage parlor owners try it during a meeting of their association about two months ago, when the main item on the agenda was "how to handle some naughty guests."
At least four owners agreed to start dressing their masseuses in similar uniforms and padlocks, he said, and others plan to follow suit soon.
But local reports have portrayed the move as a government order. Municipal official Imam Suryono said, "This new policy is still in the form of a suggestion. But in the future, we expect this policy to be enacted as city legislation."
Putting women and their pants under lock and key has inflamed an already heated national debate over the government's role in enforcing morality and strikes many here as bureaucracy run amok.
Last month, Indonesia's parliament passed a bill that makes it a crime to look at violent or pornographic material on the Internet. The penalty is up to three years in prison.
News that massage parlors were clamping down on prostitution soon followed, and with all the publicity, Setiawan is suddenly losing customers. Many of them never knew that they were getting kneaded and soothed by securely fastened women because the padlocks were hidden beneath their long tops, he said.
"It's not because the padlocks, but because they are not comfortable with the journalists" poking around, he added.
The objections of Swasono, the women's empowerment minister, were echoed on the editorial pages of the Jakarta Post, where the majority of 26 reader comments published one day this month ridiculed locking up women's pants.
Some called it a throwback to the Middle Ages, or even the Stone Age. Calling for fair treatment, one said, "The customers' hands should be chained too to prevent them from sexually harassing the masseuse."
Another suggested that modern technology offered a better solution: monitoring the women and their clients by closed-circuit TV.
Amid news that officials in the capital, Jakarta, were weighing the padlock option for its massage parlors, a Post reader wrote, "Jakarta should consider locking up the hands of politicians to prevent corrupt officials from taking bribes."
paul.watson@latimes.com
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Illusions of an Islamic State
Illusions of an Islamic State
A book by Tarek Fatah.
The book review by Ali Eteraz follows my comments;
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/04/book-illusions-of-islamic-state.html
A book by Tarek Fatah.
The book review by Ali Eteraz follows my comments;
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2008/04/book-illusions-of-islamic-state.html
If you are content with the status quo of your knowledge, this book is not for you, but if you’d like to be challenged, check this out.
At the World Muslim Congress, we take the middle path, we analyze and discuss the right wingers as well as the ultra-liberals, but our focus is on moderation and one of the qualities of moderate Muslims is “listening to” and pondering on different points of view. Moderates seldom reject a view outrightly without giving a thought. No one every agrees 100% with the other.
I am delighted to share Ali Eteraz’s review of Tarek Fatah’s book “Illusions of an Islamic State.” I have not read the book yet but I intend to read and hope the following items are included in the book.
- The Madinah pact is an example of separation of Church and State; it was initiated by the Prophet as a head of the City State and had signatures from other communities. If it was a religious government, I seriously doubt he would have taken the initiative or even get the others to go along with the freedom to practice their own religion. He Cherished that value and believed that there is no compulsion in faith, one has to believe in it to accept it.
- Prophet Muhammad’s time was pluralistic and all the work and examples generated were indeed sensitive to people of other faiths. He asked the visiting Christians from Najran to pray in his mosque when the time for prayers was up; he had walked up to a Jewish procession and kissed the Torah Scrolls they were carrying.
- Democracy was guarded by the prophet and the successive rulers of the state at that time. Prophet did not pass the mantle of state administration to the most deserved candidates at the time; his Son-in-Law Ali. Had he done that the administration would have been monarchial, passing on from relative to relative. That was not the case; each successive leader was chosen with consensus. There was campaigning and there were differences, roots of democracy some 1400 years ago as Abdul Aziz Sachedina has noted in his book.
- Prophet in his last sermon added a strong item – he said to the followers, I am leaving this book (Qur’aan) to you to follow, he did not assign an interpreter or established the clergy to be the guardians of the knowledge. As part of the individual responsibility he told his own daughter Fatima that she has to earn her way with God, through her deeds and she ain’t going to get a free pass to paradise because she is the daughter of the prophet.
- The First leader (ok, Caliph) Abu Bakr gave an acceptance speech, that I believe is one of the best examples of giving the people freedom to keep or drop the ruler. “I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have secured his rights, if God will; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God will. Obey me so long as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe me no obedience. Arise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you.
Broad definitions of a few terms;
Right wingers – a broad description would be the literalists, as the evangelicals in the Christian tradition. They do not give depth and essence to the words; it is what appears to them and nothing more.
Moderate Muslims: Majority of the Muslims fall into this category, they get along with all, they do not negate other peoples way of life nor do they have a problem with other faiths and life styles. People know they are Muslims but they do not wear neon signs on their forehead. http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2007/04/moderate-muslims.html
Liberals: Want to stretch the guidelines and test it out. Most of the changes we witness today are efforts of this group. They are not content with the status quo, they want to dig and check out the possibilities.
Mike Ghouse
http://www.worldmuslimcongress.com/
Illusions of an Islamic State
Ali Eteraz
The Huffington Post
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-eteraz/illusions-of-an-islamic-s_b_96698.html
Tarek Fatah, a pacifist, a controversial leftist activist and founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, recently published a book challenging Islamism, which he refers to as Islam's right-wing. The book is called Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State.
Fatah argues that since Islam's advent, there have been two parallel strains of the religion that are in clash.
The first, "state of Islam" is a person's moral compass; the way Islam governs an individual's personal life. Fatah has no issues with this Islam. In fact, he says that whether one is ultra-conservative or a secular Muslim should be no one else's concern.
In contrast, the second -- "Islamic State" -- occurs when a political entity uses Islam to govern and control society. Fatah has a great problem with this phenomenon, as he believes it connected to terrorism, fundamentalism and subjugation of women. His book is a sustained critique of the historical, political and theological bases upon which the idea of an Islamic state is premised.
As case studies, Fatah looks at Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reveals how in each place Islamist ideas found their genesis, how they were promoted, how they were actualized and how they have fared. He shows how leaders of dubious character have used the utopia of an Islamic state to acquire illegitimate dominance and demand cult-like obedience. The sections on Pakistan -- where Fatah was once a prominent student leader -- and Palestine -- a cause which he has supported since the 60's -- most ably demonstrate Fatah's thesis: the Islamist impulse leads to a retardation of civil society, leads to the subjugation of women, minorities and expression, and foments unnecessary crisis with external groups.
In order to diagnose the Islamist malaise, Fatah engages the intellectual argument upon which the Islamist narrative is built: the assertion that the Islamic state represents the most authentic vision of Islam. Fatah questions this vehemently. He points out that neither Muhammad nor the Quran provide for a political model, an assertion he shares with numerous other Muslim thinkers, including the current Mufti of Egypt (who takes this silence to mean that personal Islam is compatible with liberal democracy).
However Fatah goes further and shows that it was not Muhammad's intent to establish an Islamic state. Fatah's argument is novel. He says that if Muhammad had wanted to establish an Islamic state, then when he took over Mecca he would have provided for an Islamic constitution; after all, for ten years Muhammad was the de facto ruler of the city-state of Medina and there he had sought a constitution. Fatah argues that the lack of a political document in Mecca, taken in conjunction with one of Muhammad's assertions in his last sermon -- "I have completed the religion for you" -- means that Mecca was not an Islamic state, just a state ruled by a man named Muhammad where Muslims were free to establish a personal relationship with God based on their individual judgment on what constituted piety.
Fatah then delves into the lives of the Four Caliphs that followed Muhammad, painstakingly detailing how the idea of an Islamic state slowly came to prominence - not as a result of the Prophet's Companions fulfilling some religious obligation, but as a way to dominate their political opponents. Here again Fatah demonstrates ingenuity. He reveals that the title that Abu Bakr, the first caliph, took for himself, was not "Caliph of God" as later day caliphs, sultans and kings took on, but something akin to "Representative of Muhammad." Fatah believes that this fact undermines the Islamist idea of linking political power with God; after all, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, Muhammad's closest friend, a figure that Islamists purportedly follow, didn't even take such a dramatic step. Fatah also notes that the second caliph, Umar, also celebrated among Islamists, also didn't take the mantle "Caliph of God." It wasn't until the third caliph, Usman, that the term became acceptable.
Fatah ends up taking his analysis of Muslim states all the way to the end of the Abbasid Empire in the 13th century. Along the way his basic assertion is corroborated repeatedly. The states that Muslims were running were just political entities, and weren't focused on their Islamic flavor. Had that been the case, then these formative states wouldn't have made a distinction between Muslims as they did. Fatah wonders, for example, how Islamists can assert that the early Muslims lived in an Islamic state when there were classes of Muslims who had to pay the jizya (minority tax), or classes of Muslims that couldn't legally marry Arab women, or classes of Muslims based on when they had converted to Islam? If these previous states were truly Islamic states, then they wouldn't have made distinctions between Muslims -- which they readily did.
There is, Fatah believes, only one conclusion to be drawn from this: the historical Islamic states were not organized around Islam, but ethnicity (Arab over non-Arab), power (vis a vis Persians and Byzantines), and expansion (both through conflict and conversion).
In other words, Fatah concludes, the Islamist idea of an Islamic state is just a mirage. It is neither corroborated in the original sources of Islam -- the Quran and the Prophet's practice -- nor in the actual practice of the first generations of Islam.
Fatah's ideas represent a formidable intellectual challenge to Islamism.
I did, however, find some shortcomings in this book. While the first half of the book -- focusing on the case studies -- reads easily, the discussion about Muhammad and his companions becomes incredibly dense. The conclusions aren't always fleshed out and have to be inferred.
In addition, throughout the book, the sourcing is shoddy and inconsistent. On reading many assertions, I found myself wishing there were better footnotes. This is especially important when the discussion shifts to the contentious historical narrative.
Also, the book attempts an interesting synthesis -- by bringing together Sunni and Shia sources, using both to illuminate the discussion. This approach can be successful, such as when Ayatollah Modarresi used both the Sunni and Shia account to look at the history of Quranic compilation. However, the two pronged critique also has its down-side because of the historical enmity between Sunni and Shia, and the vast amount of polemics that infect this area of Islamic scholarship.
Further, throughout the book, one issue I kept wondering about was whether Fatah advocated opposing Islamists to such an extent that he would accept a secular dictator over democratically elected Islamists. There is no conclusive answer to this, but at one point in his life Fatah did consider General Nasser of Egypt his hero, which is troubling. He also seems to suggest that in Palestine, Abbas' Fatah Organization is presumptively better than Hamas because the former is secular and the latter is Islamist -- whereas experience suggests that Abbas' secularism hasn't made him any less violent.
In addition, the book contains a passing reference to the idea that anyone who calls himself a Muslim is a Muslim. Secular Muslims often like to stress this point but I have never understood why. If religion doesn't matter to you in the public sphere, then you aren't all that likely to be publicly affirming your Muslim identity anyway; so why bother with this point?
Finally, there is the figure of Fatah himself. Formerly a Marxist leader and activist for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, ever since his arrival in Canada he has had a love-hate relationship with the Muslim communities. He has accused CAIR, ISNA, MSA and ICNA of being shadow-Islamists, which has earned him little love. His own efforts to create a North-America-wide Muslim group called Progressive Muslim Union of North America, were a failure largely because many progressive Muslims, like Muqtedar Khan and Omid Safi, were put off by Fatah's confrontational style and left the group. Further, even as he fought against Sharia in the Canadian legal system, he had a public falling out with Irshad Manji (though he thanks her in the acknowledgments). In other words, there are few Muslim figures who generate negative vibes from both the conservative and liberal side of Islam and Fatah is one of them.
I, personally, don't agree with many of Fatah's positions -- having criticized him in the past.
I, personally, come from the contingent of activists who thought that Fatah did create some of the tension that led to the downfall of the Progressive Muslim Union of North America (I say that as an observer as I was not a member). Unlike him, I don't think Islamic finance as practiced by Western banks strengthens Islamists, rather it forces the entire scheme to be more beholden to international regulation. Unlike him, I don't find any thing particularly threatening about the free and consensual wearing of the hijab. Unlike him, I believe that the theologian Ghazali and segments of Islamic traditionalism are not natural allies of Islamism (of clericalism, certainly).
Having said that, I think this book is a positive contribution to the discussion about contemporary Islam and certainly a valuable addition to the voices that are critically looking at Islam's right-wing. Fatah speaks about Islamic leaders with familiarity and respect, while engaging their ideas critically. He comes from the left so has vehemently opposed American interventionism for decades -- he says he writes to wake up his Muslim brethren, not attack them. He deconstructs Islamic history to separate it from the political reading that dictators, tyrants and fundamentalists have given it. Fatah writes well, has novel ideas, participates in the Islamic tradition, and he is clearly passionate about his private practice of Islam (he has made the hajj twice). Agree with him or not, I don't think there is any other public intellectual in the North American arena -- Muslim or other -- who could have written this book.
Get your copy of:
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
• Hardcover: 432 pages
• Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
• ISBN-10: 0470841168
• ISBN-13: 978-0470841167
Right wingers – a broad description would be the literalists, as the evangelicals in the Christian tradition. They do not give depth and essence to the words; it is what appears to them and nothing more.
Moderate Muslims: Majority of the Muslims fall into this category, they get along with all, they do not negate other peoples way of life nor do they have a problem with other faiths and life styles. People know they are Muslims but they do not wear neon signs on their forehead. http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com/2007/04/moderate-muslims.html
Liberals: Want to stretch the guidelines and test it out. Most of the changes we witness today are efforts of this group. They are not content with the status quo, they want to dig and check out the possibilities.
Mike Ghouse
http://www.worldmuslimcongress.com/
Illusions of an Islamic State
Ali Eteraz
The Huffington Post
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-eteraz/illusions-of-an-islamic-s_b_96698.html
Tarek Fatah, a pacifist, a controversial leftist activist and founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, recently published a book challenging Islamism, which he refers to as Islam's right-wing. The book is called Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State.
Fatah argues that since Islam's advent, there have been two parallel strains of the religion that are in clash.
The first, "state of Islam" is a person's moral compass; the way Islam governs an individual's personal life. Fatah has no issues with this Islam. In fact, he says that whether one is ultra-conservative or a secular Muslim should be no one else's concern.
In contrast, the second -- "Islamic State" -- occurs when a political entity uses Islam to govern and control society. Fatah has a great problem with this phenomenon, as he believes it connected to terrorism, fundamentalism and subjugation of women. His book is a sustained critique of the historical, political and theological bases upon which the idea of an Islamic state is premised.
As case studies, Fatah looks at Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reveals how in each place Islamist ideas found their genesis, how they were promoted, how they were actualized and how they have fared. He shows how leaders of dubious character have used the utopia of an Islamic state to acquire illegitimate dominance and demand cult-like obedience. The sections on Pakistan -- where Fatah was once a prominent student leader -- and Palestine -- a cause which he has supported since the 60's -- most ably demonstrate Fatah's thesis: the Islamist impulse leads to a retardation of civil society, leads to the subjugation of women, minorities and expression, and foments unnecessary crisis with external groups.
In order to diagnose the Islamist malaise, Fatah engages the intellectual argument upon which the Islamist narrative is built: the assertion that the Islamic state represents the most authentic vision of Islam. Fatah questions this vehemently. He points out that neither Muhammad nor the Quran provide for a political model, an assertion he shares with numerous other Muslim thinkers, including the current Mufti of Egypt (who takes this silence to mean that personal Islam is compatible with liberal democracy).
However Fatah goes further and shows that it was not Muhammad's intent to establish an Islamic state. Fatah's argument is novel. He says that if Muhammad had wanted to establish an Islamic state, then when he took over Mecca he would have provided for an Islamic constitution; after all, for ten years Muhammad was the de facto ruler of the city-state of Medina and there he had sought a constitution. Fatah argues that the lack of a political document in Mecca, taken in conjunction with one of Muhammad's assertions in his last sermon -- "I have completed the religion for you" -- means that Mecca was not an Islamic state, just a state ruled by a man named Muhammad where Muslims were free to establish a personal relationship with God based on their individual judgment on what constituted piety.
Fatah then delves into the lives of the Four Caliphs that followed Muhammad, painstakingly detailing how the idea of an Islamic state slowly came to prominence - not as a result of the Prophet's Companions fulfilling some religious obligation, but as a way to dominate their political opponents. Here again Fatah demonstrates ingenuity. He reveals that the title that Abu Bakr, the first caliph, took for himself, was not "Caliph of God" as later day caliphs, sultans and kings took on, but something akin to "Representative of Muhammad." Fatah believes that this fact undermines the Islamist idea of linking political power with God; after all, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, Muhammad's closest friend, a figure that Islamists purportedly follow, didn't even take such a dramatic step. Fatah also notes that the second caliph, Umar, also celebrated among Islamists, also didn't take the mantle "Caliph of God." It wasn't until the third caliph, Usman, that the term became acceptable.
Fatah ends up taking his analysis of Muslim states all the way to the end of the Abbasid Empire in the 13th century. Along the way his basic assertion is corroborated repeatedly. The states that Muslims were running were just political entities, and weren't focused on their Islamic flavor. Had that been the case, then these formative states wouldn't have made a distinction between Muslims as they did. Fatah wonders, for example, how Islamists can assert that the early Muslims lived in an Islamic state when there were classes of Muslims who had to pay the jizya (minority tax), or classes of Muslims that couldn't legally marry Arab women, or classes of Muslims based on when they had converted to Islam? If these previous states were truly Islamic states, then they wouldn't have made distinctions between Muslims -- which they readily did.
There is, Fatah believes, only one conclusion to be drawn from this: the historical Islamic states were not organized around Islam, but ethnicity (Arab over non-Arab), power (vis a vis Persians and Byzantines), and expansion (both through conflict and conversion).
In other words, Fatah concludes, the Islamist idea of an Islamic state is just a mirage. It is neither corroborated in the original sources of Islam -- the Quran and the Prophet's practice -- nor in the actual practice of the first generations of Islam.
Fatah's ideas represent a formidable intellectual challenge to Islamism.
I did, however, find some shortcomings in this book. While the first half of the book -- focusing on the case studies -- reads easily, the discussion about Muhammad and his companions becomes incredibly dense. The conclusions aren't always fleshed out and have to be inferred.
In addition, throughout the book, the sourcing is shoddy and inconsistent. On reading many assertions, I found myself wishing there were better footnotes. This is especially important when the discussion shifts to the contentious historical narrative.
Also, the book attempts an interesting synthesis -- by bringing together Sunni and Shia sources, using both to illuminate the discussion. This approach can be successful, such as when Ayatollah Modarresi used both the Sunni and Shia account to look at the history of Quranic compilation. However, the two pronged critique also has its down-side because of the historical enmity between Sunni and Shia, and the vast amount of polemics that infect this area of Islamic scholarship.
Further, throughout the book, one issue I kept wondering about was whether Fatah advocated opposing Islamists to such an extent that he would accept a secular dictator over democratically elected Islamists. There is no conclusive answer to this, but at one point in his life Fatah did consider General Nasser of Egypt his hero, which is troubling. He also seems to suggest that in Palestine, Abbas' Fatah Organization is presumptively better than Hamas because the former is secular and the latter is Islamist -- whereas experience suggests that Abbas' secularism hasn't made him any less violent.
In addition, the book contains a passing reference to the idea that anyone who calls himself a Muslim is a Muslim. Secular Muslims often like to stress this point but I have never understood why. If religion doesn't matter to you in the public sphere, then you aren't all that likely to be publicly affirming your Muslim identity anyway; so why bother with this point?
Finally, there is the figure of Fatah himself. Formerly a Marxist leader and activist for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, ever since his arrival in Canada he has had a love-hate relationship with the Muslim communities. He has accused CAIR, ISNA, MSA and ICNA of being shadow-Islamists, which has earned him little love. His own efforts to create a North-America-wide Muslim group called Progressive Muslim Union of North America, were a failure largely because many progressive Muslims, like Muqtedar Khan and Omid Safi, were put off by Fatah's confrontational style and left the group. Further, even as he fought against Sharia in the Canadian legal system, he had a public falling out with Irshad Manji (though he thanks her in the acknowledgments). In other words, there are few Muslim figures who generate negative vibes from both the conservative and liberal side of Islam and Fatah is one of them.
I, personally, don't agree with many of Fatah's positions -- having criticized him in the past.
I, personally, come from the contingent of activists who thought that Fatah did create some of the tension that led to the downfall of the Progressive Muslim Union of North America (I say that as an observer as I was not a member). Unlike him, I don't think Islamic finance as practiced by Western banks strengthens Islamists, rather it forces the entire scheme to be more beholden to international regulation. Unlike him, I don't find any thing particularly threatening about the free and consensual wearing of the hijab. Unlike him, I believe that the theologian Ghazali and segments of Islamic traditionalism are not natural allies of Islamism (of clericalism, certainly).
Having said that, I think this book is a positive contribution to the discussion about contemporary Islam and certainly a valuable addition to the voices that are critically looking at Islam's right-wing. Fatah speaks about Islamic leaders with familiarity and respect, while engaging their ideas critically. He comes from the left so has vehemently opposed American interventionism for decades -- he says he writes to wake up his Muslim brethren, not attack them. He deconstructs Islamic history to separate it from the political reading that dictators, tyrants and fundamentalists have given it. Fatah writes well, has novel ideas, participates in the Islamic tradition, and he is clearly passionate about his private practice of Islam (he has made the hajj twice). Agree with him or not, I don't think there is any other public intellectual in the North American arena -- Muslim or other -- who could have written this book.
Get your copy of:
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
• Hardcover: 432 pages
• Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
• ISBN-10: 0470841168
• ISBN-13: 978-0470841167
Saturday, April 5, 2008
Bahrain not sunny for Shias
Article follows my comments;This article is worth reading in the light of how governments get toppled violently. It is the tragedy of the humanity, where the rulers gets arrogant and believe that the minority is subservient to them, because they know it better.
Peace talks fall flat in the face of injustice which ensures non-sustainability of a government, people will bear it and bear it, but deep in their heart there is a spark that craves for justice, and each incident accumulates and catches fire to the point that, it is difficult to reverse the idea of getting even when they get their turn.
This arrogance is not a characteristic of Bahraini rulers alone, it is with the Republicans, Neocons, Islamists, Hindutva, Zionists and other extremists groups.
I hope the Bahraini rulers wake up and take care of the disadvantaged ones before it is too late. Stability of a government is directly dependent on its ability to ensure justice for one and all.
Mike Ghouse
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
Peace talks fall flat in the face of injustice which ensures non-sustainability of a government, people will bear it and bear it, but deep in their heart there is a spark that craves for justice, and each incident accumulates and catches fire to the point that, it is difficult to reverse the idea of getting even when they get their turn.
This arrogance is not a characteristic of Bahraini rulers alone, it is with the Republicans, Neocons, Islamists, Hindutva, Zionists and other extremists groups.
I hope the Bahraini rulers wake up and take care of the disadvantaged ones before it is too late. Stability of a government is directly dependent on its ability to ensure justice for one and all.
Mike Ghouse
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
Not so sunny for Shias
Apr 3rd 2008 MANAMA, BAHRAIN
From The Economist print edition
A put-upon majority feels done down—and is getting angry
THE monarchy of Bahrain regards itself as a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. It was the first in the Gulf to give all its citizens the vote, setting up a partially elected parliament, albeit with limited powers, in 2002. Yet in the past few months its officials concede that in an average week there have been more than two riots and five public protests.
Most of the unrest takes place outside the predominantly Sunni capital, Manama, in poorer, mostly Shia, villages. No official statistics are published but some villagers say that a third or even half of them have no jobs. Bahrainis are readier to work in menial jobs than their wealthier counterparts in Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates but cheap foreign workers depress wages. A typical foreign construction worker is housed in a labour camp, cannot bring his family to Bahrain and earns around $160 a month, which would barely support a Bahraini family with four or five children.
The soaring price of land is another grumbling point. Some Bahrainis have been waiting for state housing since 1992. Mortgages are hard to get. Yet the government has embarked on a grandiose campaign to reclaim land, with banks pouring cash into construction. Many of the new schemes are for fancy flats and artificial islands, like those in Dubai, and are more likely to be sold to rich Saudis or people from the emirates than to Bahrainis.
To make matters worse, these inequalities often have a sectarian tint. Most Bahrainis are Shias but the royal family is Sunni. The Shias are more likely to be jobless; many government employers discriminate in favour of Sunnis. “Recently I went for a public-sector job and they asked me what sect I was,” says a sour Shia mechanic. “But I didn't come to the garage to pray!”
Ebrahim Sharif, a former banker, heads Wa'ad, a liberal Arab-nationalist party. Himself a Sunni, he thinks Sunni and Shia Bahrainis should form a united opposition. “Most of the Shias are worse off than the average Sunni but the only first-class citizens are the royal family,” he says. However his party lost all its seats in the last election, and the parliament is dominated by Islamists of both sects.
These included the country's main Shia opposition group, Wefaq National Islamic Society, which joined parliament in 2006 after boycotting the previous election four years earlier. Its presence raised hopes of change. But voters are growing frustrated with parliament as they realise how few powers its elected members have. The government controls the pace of liberalisation. Local political activists get little support from abroad. America is wary of calling for more democracy. It fears that parliamentarians may turn against America's naval base in Bahrain, its biggest in the Gulf; last year a majority of them declared that it should not be used in any war between America and Iran. More recently the government has signed an agreement with America to help Bahrain develop peaceful nuclear technology.
Wefaq must now deal with one of the trickiest sectarian issues raised by its supporters: a widespread rumour that the government is handing out passports to Sunnis from other countries in an attempt to turn the Shias into a minority. These fears were raised in a report in 2006 by a former government adviser, Salah al-Bandar, who said he had confidential government documents revealing such a plan, The government hotly denies any such thing. The row has flared up again with the publication of government statistics that show the population jumping by 41% last year and the number of citizens growing by 15%, against a previous rate of 2.4%.
Wefaq wants to question a minister named in Mr Bandar's report. The constitution says a minister must submit to questions in parliament if five of the assembly's members so demand; in this case, 18 want the minister questioned, so far in vain. The row has paralysed parliament for the past six weeks as debates have descended into shouting matches; for one week it was suspended. A Sunni Islamist member says it should be dissolved. Wefaq is wondering whether it was sensible to have joined it.
This week, just before its officials were to attend a UN meeting to review Bahrain's human-rights record, the government said it would set up a new human-rights task-force. What a coincidence
Sunday, March 30, 2008
Debate on Islamic State
I just received an email about the upcoming debate on Islamic state, and I was completely taken back at the fiction Mr. Zuhdi Jasser is concoting and then solving it, and of course becoming a darling to the Neo-cons* (http://hatesermons.blogspot.com/2008/03/neocons.html )
First of all, I must acknowledge my respect for Mr. Zhudi Jasser for the 99 good things he does, but on this upcoming debate, he is wrong, per the information presented in the item received from him.
He seems to have a misunderstanding of Main stream Muslims and I have to call him on this. He once stated that all mosques in America deliver hate sermons, I asked him to prove it. Which he corrected to at least not the mosques he had visited. Even Wall Street Journal had printed that a while back, I wrote to them to prove it. Both have passed out this rumor as a fact. It is not building healthy and truthful and peaceful societies.
I hope we can work on legislation that would require all public lectures and sermons to be recorded and made available through internet and public archives. Any hate sermon, any incitement or whole sale prejudices must be called to justify. Just as one cannot shout “Fire” in a public place to disrupt peace, one should not be allowed to spew hate in public. This applies to all places of worship and non profits that are using public benefit through tax exemption. http://hatesermons.blogspot.com/2008/03/hate-sermons-from-pulpit.html
A statement is ascribed to Mr. Zuhdi Jasser as “a self-proclaimed ‘Moderate’ Muslim from Arizona…and whose views on Islam are well outside the scope of the mainstream Muslim world”. Indeed, his understanding appears to be outside the scope of the Mainstream Muslim World. Mr. Zuhdi Jasser is not in touch.
The mainstream Americans, Main stream British, Indians or Main stream Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Jews are moderate people who want to get along with all. They are no bigots, they believe in living their life and letting others live theirs. The do not aspire or conspire for secretive societies, they do not want to rule by injustice and push their ideas on to others, as they believe, if you are unjust, you are going to pay. They are law abiding citizens, where as the Neocons are not. Every one of them has fouled or still to be caught.
Mr. Zuhdi lacks understanding of the mainstream Muslim world, let alone mainstream America. Extremism is not a mainstream staple, it is a fringe of the society. Neocons and Islamists are indeed fringe elements of the society. They are incapable of dialogue, they rather use the megaphones or gunpowder and bulldoze all who oppose them, because they are insecure and abuse the power they have by pushing others. They will silence you by calling you unpatriotic if you question them. Their time is up now, thank God.
The Neocons, the Islamists, the Zionists and the Hindutvadis are a tiny-weenie minority driving the world by frightening the crap out of constipated men. Their time is up too and I pray that the see the benefit in dialogue and conflict mitigation as a path to peace, peace to them and every one around them. I pray that they jump on this path to bring peace, I know they will succeed, as they have the passion and funds to do it.
The mainstream Muslims do not aspire or have any thing to do with "Is the Ideological Desire to Establish an Islamic State a Clear and Present Danger to the U.S.?" They have come to America to be free and not have another lawless society in the name of any religion, be it their own.
The words appeal to the money throwing Neocons, who love the above words " clear and present danger". It is a frightening tactic to keep their grip.
The main stream Muslim knows deeply in his hearts that, democracy is the right form of governance. No doubt, there are a few out there, who dream Islamic form of government, which is about justice, but by no stretch of imagination they are main stream.
Even those in the Mainstream Muslims who may dream of the Islamic rule, will not do anything to make it happen, as no form of current label of Islamic rule works. None of the Saudi, Irani, Afghani or Sudanese brand will work. They would rather opt for the democracy as in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (now), Turkey, Bangladesh and India – together Muslims in these democracies make about 2/3rds of Muslim world.
Main stream Muslims do want democracy, and a nation where justice prevails. They do not want the kind of Khilafat that is projected by the Neocons “they are here to dominate and subjugate others.” Absolute baloney! No significant group of Muslims wants that. However, they do wish a Pope like figure who can make small petty decisions and give relief to apostates, rape victims, divorce and other issues, but it ain’t going to happen.
Islam is not designed to have a pope. Neither the Qur’aan nor the Prophet assigned a person to interpret the Qur'aan for the Muslims. The prophet said, you are individually accountable on the day of reckoning, so it is your responsibility to read and understand the book I am leaving behind for you. Islam took the priesthood off from controlling the knowledge and influencing the masses, the community is free to learn and practice their religion on their own. It was like internet in 612 AD, Prophet Muhammad making the knowledge available to every one.
To be a Muslim is to be a peace maker; one who constantly seeks to mitigate conflicts and nurtures goodwill for co-existence and world peace - God wants his creation to be in peace and harmony, and that is the chief purpose of religion.
Thus the role of the Caliph was state administration, but people opted to seek knowledge from them, as the first four rightly guided caliphs had a full understanding of the religion. (Read the balance created between the Scholars and the Caliphs from 9th Centurn onwards -http://sharialaws.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-shariah.html)
In essence there is a separation of church and state. Muslims had a plurlistic society during the Prophet's time, infact the Madina declaration may be first of its kind where state signed a joint treaty among the people of different faiths to practice their faith freely. Muslims never had that opportunity until the mid of the last century. Indeed, America was the only nation on the earth that had democracy some 225 years ago, every nation on the earth until recently was a colony, tyranny, monarchy or dictatorship. Neocons are a hurdle for democracy, if God can help put Obama in place, we can see democracies around the world flourishing, it is his attitude, lack of arrogance and the desire to accommodate that will change the world for Good. Presently 2/3rds of Muslims live in democracy; it may go up to 75% or higher while still a whole lot of world needs to embrace democracy including our current president.
In conclusion, the debate is healthy and would be an opportunity to establish that Mainstream Muslims do not want any form of governance other than democracy.
Mike Ghouse is a Speaker, Thinker, Writer and a Moderator. He is a frequent guest on talk radio and local television network discussing Pluralism, politics, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, India and civic issues. His comments, news analysis, opinions and columns can be found on the Websites and Blogs listed at his personal website www.MikeGhouse.net. He can be reached at MikeGhouse@gmail.com or (214) 325-1916
Debate on Islamic State
You are invited to "THE GREAT DEBATE” A Muslim Debate
Is the Ideological Desire to Establish an Islamic State a Clear and Present Danger to the U.S.?"
...come and witness an example of a real contest of ideas within the Muslim community in what is one of the most critical issues of this century.
WHEN: SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 6:30 – 9:30pm
WHO: The debate will be between Dr. Zuhdi Jasser & Imam Al-Darsani
Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Phoenix, Arizona.
Imam Mohamed Al-Darsani of the Islamic Center for Peace in Fort Myers, Florida.
WITH MODERATOR: Michael Cromartie, Vice-President, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C.
WHAT: THEY WILL DEBATE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION in an established debate format:
Is the ideological desire to establish an Islamic state a clear and present danger to the United States of America? (Dr. Jasser will debate the affirmative and Imam Al-Darsani will debate the negative)
Other issues covered may include:
Islam v. Islamist
Koran v. Constitution
Role of political Islam in America
Role of political Islam as a root cause of Islamist terror
Status of Jews and Christians
Terror and Al Qaeda
SPONSORED BY: THE FLORIDASECURITY COUNCIL www.FloridaSecurityCouncil.org
WHERE: EDISON COLLEGE IN NAPLES FLORIDA. 7007 Lely Cultural Pkwy, Naples, Florida 34113
Reserve your free seats at:
www.debate.eventbrite.com
Do not delay - Seating is very limited
BACKGROUND: The debate evolved after a National Security Briefing in Naples on February 23rd held by the Florida Security Council which showed the film "Obsession" followed by a panel discussion of experts concerning the threat of Radical Islamism upon the West.
Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser was among the anti-terrorism experts included on the panel following the showing of the film.
Imam Mohamed Al-Darsani was present at the event and during the Q+A period objected to the film and the discussion.
Tom Trento, Director of the Florida Security Council after the event stated, “Moreover, the Imam from the ICP, Mohamed Al-Darsani, in print afterwards and before the audience of almost 400, indicated that the whole evening was just an effort to scare people with a film that is propaganda and a guest speaker who is quote, a “self-proclaimed ‘Moderate’ Muslim from Arizona…and whose views on Islam are well outside the scope of the mainstream Muslim world”.
Thus, the possibility of a public debate between Dr. Jasser and Imam Mohamed Al-Darsani was subsequently raised in order to formally discuss the central issues which divide Islamists from Americans.
The Florida Security Council stepped in to organize and sponsor the debate.
A FEW COMMENTS AND RESPONSES:
Members share, opinions are your own
this issue of World Muslim Congress is archived at:
http://muslimarchives.blogspot.com/2008/03/03-31-2008-islamic-state.html
1. Kimat gul khatak -Debate on Islamic State
2. Shamim Siddiqi - Debate on Islamic State
3. Tarek Fatah - Debate on Islamic State
4. Turkman - Debate on Islamic State
5. Mubashir - - Debate on Islamic State
2. Shamim Siddiqi - Debate on Islamic State
3. Tarek Fatah - Debate on Islamic State
4. Turkman - Debate on Islamic State
5. Mubashir - - Debate on Islamic State
Mike Ghouse
www.worldmuslimcongress.com
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com
http://quraan-today.blogspot.com
http://sharialaws.blogspot.com
www.worldmuslimcongress.com
http://worldmuslimcongress.blogspot.com
http://quraan-today.blogspot.com
http://sharialaws.blogspot.com
From: kimat gul khatak Date: Mon Mar 31, 2008 4:43 pm Subject: Re: Dallas Pakistanis :: Debate on Islamic State
Mike asa,Great effort.
I am amazed as a Muslim why do I have to apologize for being one. No Religion has democracy AS A MODEL OF SOCIAL JUSTICE. Am I wrong ? Islam as a religion is the only one nearest to the present day collective responsibility or "Democracy".It would be very useful to debate the view point of Judaism, Christianity( the most undemocratic of all) Buddhism and Hinduism or any other ism for that matter where divine thought is based on Democracy. The thought becomes non divine when democratised.If possible it would be nice to quote biblical edits for democratic administration. A debate on the subject of Christianity and democracy would be nice to have.Let us see how democratic Christianity as a religion is?
kimat gul khatak
Moderator :: Kimat, excellent points and we need to be explore. Your principle is good, every group should be judged from the same rules.
Islam: the state and religion were one and the same during the times of Prophet and through Hazarat Ali, then it splintered, Hazrat Imam took the lead in Religion where as the state was run by Muawia. However what distinguished the times of Prophet was the multi-faith environment that led to the Madinah pact and innumerable examples of Prophet's respect for co-existence. All of that vanished in Islam's birth place, but moved to Spain and India and literally died with the fall of the empires, and with that the Islamic tradition of pluralism was decimated. Under colonialism, it took a different from altogether. Again from the independence movements in the 40's, it took ground in Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and a few other nations. Thank God, the Prophets' tradition of inclusiveness and experience of multi-faith is resurfacing in the US and Canada and hope it spreads to the "Islamic" Nations. The signs are there... the opening of Temple in Dubai, Church in Qatar, and now possible church in Saudi Arabia. A full circle.
The early Christianity was simply a religion and not a state. The Romans and Kings in the 3rd and 4th century upped it to a state religion. Just as with Islam and all other religions, the Kings bent the rules to preserve their kingdom and their excesses's were indistinguishable from religion. Very few questioned them and risked their lives.
Cyrus upped the Zoroastrian faith to be the state religion, I do not know of any excesses by the Zoroastrian Kings, it does not mean they do not exist. It is the individuals that do wrongs things, not the religion.
Hinduism was both religion and a state at least from Krishna and Kurukshetra War, Ram Rajya with Lord Ram. Prior to that religion was not the domain of kings.
Buddhism was upped to State religion during the reign of King Ashoka and he sent his emissaries all over the world to spread the word. However, the state policy was no warfare, in fact, for a while he did not have a army or police in his kingdom.
Judaism was a state religion with David, Solomon and the other Kings, but for a period of 2000 years, there was no government that was labeled Jewish.
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Shamim Siddiqi - Debate on Islamic State
Dear Br. Ghouse, ASA Your challenging attitude is worth more than any thing in the hours of trial of Muslim Ummah. The West has developed the tendency to generalize things, making mountains of mole hills. Then, they condemn the Muslim Ummah even its extremely routine rituals of Ebadah. The facts and figures that the WESTERN MEDIA publishes against Muslim activities in the West are highly exaggerated and are put out of context. They make a "bombshell" out of some smoking cigar and then create all hue and cry in the so-called name of terrorism. Even the legitimate demands of Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere in the world are painted like the most dangerous things.
Dear Br. Ghouse, ASA Your challenging attitude is worth more than any thing in the hours of trial of Muslim Ummah. The West has developed the tendency to generalize things, making mountains of mole hills. Then, they condemn the Muslim Ummah even its extremely routine rituals of Ebadah. The facts and figures that the WESTERN MEDIA publishes against Muslim activities in the West are highly exaggerated and are put out of context. They make a "bombshell" out of some smoking cigar and then create all hue and cry in the so-called name of terrorism. Even the legitimate demands of Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere in the world are painted like the most dangerous things.
Osama is dead long ago. Pervez Musharraf confirmed it at the end of devastating bombardment of Tora Bora. But America and its anti-Islam media is keeping him alive for the sake of their propaganda stunts against Islam and General Pervez has now become its senseless tool/partner in this hegemony. Osama is now the "need" of America and it is keeping him alive by attributing false and concocted statements to him. America, in fact, is preparing the ground to attack the Pak- Afghan boarder area, perhaps very "soon", perhaps before the ouster of General Pervez from Pakistan politics. It must be condemned vehemently by brothers like you, lest it becomes too late.
Shamim Siddiqi
WWW.dawahinamericas.com
Moderator – Brother Shamim, your words describe the situation very well. Making mountains out of Mole Hills. Recently I wrote that when an ugly father killed his daughter for disobedience, it was all over the world and was a fodder for the talk show hosts, because the man was a Muslim. The very same week at least 50 other fathers killed their siblings for one reason or the other, one in Florida killed the baby because he wanted a son, he was not a Muslim, then one in Texas smashed the 6 months old baby’s head on the rock, he was not a Muslim either. The media has chosen to obey the Neocons (http://hatesermons.blogspot.com/2008/03/neocons.html ) and it is an uphill battle.
Moderator – Brother Shamim, your words describe the situation very well. Making mountains out of Mole Hills. Recently I wrote that when an ugly father killed his daughter for disobedience, it was all over the world and was a fodder for the talk show hosts, because the man was a Muslim. The very same week at least 50 other fathers killed their siblings for one reason or the other, one in Florida killed the baby because he wanted a son, he was not a Muslim, then one in Texas smashed the 6 months old baby’s head on the rock, he was not a Muslim either. The media has chosen to obey the Neocons (http://hatesermons.blogspot.com/2008/03/neocons.html ) and it is an uphill battle.
Fortunately there is a reservoir of Good people – greater than 95% of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists are moderates – the mainstream people, who want to get along with all and don’t care for the lies media lays out in front of them, they rather watch American Idol, and I am glad they do. We can change the perceptions by being with them. As a community we live in Islands and Mosques, do not get out and be with others… look at our weddings, funerals, birthdays, anniversaries… do we have people other than ourselves? The only idea about Muslims they get is from TV and that ain’t good. People have to see us and believe that we are like them in being good to others, caring for the needy, helping the deprived … we are all of it, but others don’t about it. Change comes, if you, yes, you, each one of you starts being with others. No one will do it. Alhamdu Lillah, at least , I do my part in letting others know that as a Muslim I am on par with them being a good and decent human being. May Allah grant his grace for me to do more.
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Tarek Fatah - Debate on Islamic State
Mike,
The debate has not yet taken place and you have already declared Zuhdi Jasser as 'dead wrong'. Then you label him as a neocon, but then suggest that your 'respect' him.
As far as mosque sermons go, could you identify any mosque in the US that has distanced itself from the doctrine of Jihad as pronounced by such 20th century Islamists as Syed Qutb, Maudoodi and Hassan al-Banna? Unless one explicitly states that the doctrine of Jihad does not apply in today's world, that imam or mosque should be considered as supporting jihadi ideology and hence follows the extremist agenda set by their Saudi funders.
In a world where International treaties and multilateral charters govern international relations, there is no room for extra-state players to conduct free-lance jihad.
Tarek
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
The author analyzes the diverging aspirations that separate the Islamist from the Muslim, and the Islamic State from the State of Islam.
Pre-order today at Amazon.com or Chapters.ca
Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State
The author analyzes the diverging aspirations that separate the Islamist from the Muslim, and the Islamic State from the State of Islam.
Pre-order today at Amazon.com or Chapters.ca
Moderator: Tarek, As a Muslim I feel duped by a few Muslim scholars from medieval times who had cleverly presented the wrong kind Jihad as the core of Islam. There is no offensive war or aggression in Islam. Thanks for the 9/11 tragedy, we are finding the truth out of necessity and I pray that Muslim majority who believes in the right Jihad have the guts to speak out against the wrong Jihad dumped on our thoughts for centuries.
I do know two of the Imams in my town who have earned the respect from others scholars nationwide. They are Imam Zia Kavakci and Imam Zia Shaikh of Dallas and Irving respectively. I don’t believe they subscribe to the methodology word for word. I am copying this to both of them and will report their response. Both of them are engaged in multi-faith dialogue and they are part of the community at large. Saudi Funding may be a reality elsewhere, but I see it as a myth at least in my City.
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Turkman - Debate on Islamic State
Sir,
I think, you do not read newspapers in USA. There was a news item that FBI had hired some Mosque-going Moslims to spy on, what goes on in Mosques. Though they had just submitted their report of about just over 100 Mosques, FBI had announced the result that 3/4th of Mosques in USA spread hate against USA and Non Moslim Americans. This is why I have stopped going to any Mosque.
Turkman - Debate on Islamic State
Sir,
I think, you do not read newspapers in USA. There was a news item that FBI had hired some Mosque-going Moslims to spy on, what goes on in Mosques. Though they had just submitted their report of about just over 100 Mosques, FBI had announced the result that 3/4th of Mosques in USA spread hate against USA and Non Moslim Americans. This is why I have stopped going to any Mosque.
FBI is hiring more Moslims now to finish the study with tons of audio and vedio tapes, don't worry and stop spreading hate against the West and USA yourself ...!
I understand, all new Immigrants have rights but Moslims like me, who do not know, how to become Traitors of their country, USA have some rights too.
Moderator: Mr. Turkman, do you trust FBI & CIA - whose facts were WMD's, Iran's Nuclear development... and an endless amount of concoctions. Please let me know where they have published it, I want to challenge it. Which Mosque did they spew the hate, I would like to visit that mosque and speak up, if the non-sense is still going on. Please write what exactly they said...
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Mubashir - - Debate on Islamic State
Dear friends,
Where inter-state treaties apply and adhered to and where there is a trouble shooting mechanism in place (like the UN) or World Court, perhaps it may not be a good idea to lauch a personal Jihad.
However, where a situation exists where a state is waging a war for land and settlements by occupying another nation's and which is balatantly supported by a powerful state which does not play fair, and where the UN resolutions are played with, what are Palestinians supposed to do? Would not resisting an evil occupation come under Jihad?
What about the Afghans who resisted the Soviets and now the NATO allies. They had nothing to do with 911. Did Mullah Omar not offer to hand over Osama if the US furnished proof of his guilt?
What about illegal occupation of Iraq? Do it's inhabitants have the right to resist and under what circumstances their resistance qualify as a Jihad/Resistance/struggle?
What Muslims need to do is to have an organisation like OIC where such matters be referred to (after exhuasting all other available avenues) and seek advise to see if a resistance qualifies for a Jihad or not.
Any ideas?
Mubashir
Mubashir - - Debate on Islamic State
Dear friends,
Where inter-state treaties apply and adhered to and where there is a trouble shooting mechanism in place (like the UN) or World Court, perhaps it may not be a good idea to lauch a personal Jihad.
However, where a situation exists where a state is waging a war for land and settlements by occupying another nation's and which is balatantly supported by a powerful state which does not play fair, and where the UN resolutions are played with, what are Palestinians supposed to do? Would not resisting an evil occupation come under Jihad?
What about the Afghans who resisted the Soviets and now the NATO allies. They had nothing to do with 911. Did Mullah Omar not offer to hand over Osama if the US furnished proof of his guilt?
What about illegal occupation of Iraq? Do it's inhabitants have the right to resist and under what circumstances their resistance qualify as a Jihad/Resistance/struggle?
What Muslims need to do is to have an organisation like OIC where such matters be referred to (after exhuasting all other available avenues) and seek advise to see if a resistance qualifies for a Jihad or not.
Any ideas?
Mubashir
Moderator - Palestinians have every right to defend their freedom and every human should support their right. It is indeed a struggle against occupation. Shame on us, the Americans for judging the Palestinians based on the actions of the leadership, rather than their plight. Just as the Majority of Americans want out of Iraq, but are bullied by our lousy leadership, Palestinians have endured a similar leadership trauma, so goes with the leadership of Israel. The suffering is heaped on a common Palestinian and an Israeli.
It is the leadership on all sides that is crooked and in the hands of Christian, Jewish and Muslim Neocons, who are incapable of thinking solutions, violence is all they know. The leadership did not guide the oppressed ones to express their frustration and anger in the right way. Israel and the US do not stand on moral high grounds , but the actions of Hamas and the leadership has lost them the moral grounds too. If Hamas can think about the hopeless future of their children and swallow the false pride and renounce their statement of wiping Israel out, and renounce violence towards children and women, they cannot lose in the long run. They can easily gain the moral upper hand. The good people of the world will overwhelm the Neocons with sheer goodness and morality.
Both sides need to learn co-existence. Oppression, occupation and violence will not take them where they really want - Hope for one and security for the other.
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CIVIL DIALOGUE
The people in Dallas are making an effort to understand and clean their own hearts first, when we are free from bias, it would be easy to share that with others. Islam teaches us in so many ways to "respect the otherness of others" and it is time we find simple practical ways of doing it.
